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CHAPTER I
Origin of the Controversy
On April 15, 1861 President Lincoln issued a proclamation call
ing for troops

for the purpose of "repossessing" the forts in the

South which had been seized from the Union.^ Two days later, Presldent Davis of the Confederate States of America by public procla
mation invited applications for letters of marque and reprisal,
thereby indicating the Intention of waging war on the high seas
against the commerce of the United States.2 On April 19 Lincoln,
acting, he said, "in pursuance of the laws of the United States and
of the law of nations," issued a proclamation announcing that he
had "set on foot a blockade" of the Southern ports from South Caro
lina to Texas, and eight days later he included the
North Carolina and Virginia.

coasts of

He declared that any person, acting

upon the pretended authority of those states, would be held amena
ble to the laws of the United States for the prevention and punishment of piracy.

The proclamation directed that a vessel approach

ing or attempting to leave a blockaded port "be duly warned by the
commander of one of the blockading vessels who will endorse on her
register the fact and date of such warning, and if the same vessel
shall again attempt to enter or leave the blockaded port she will
be captured and sent to the nearest port for such proceedings against her and her cargo as prizes as may be deemed advisable."-^
Until the time of the Issuance of the proclamations by Lincoln
and Davis, the British government had not decided upon a policy in

regard to the rupture of the Union.

Now they were faced with the

problem of what seemed to them a civil war, and in order to protect
their citizens from its ravages, a policy had to be determined defin
itely.

Discussion in the House of Lords on April 29, 1861 referred

to the news of the Civil War, and Malmesbury asked if the govern
ment had tried to prevent it, or had set on foot negotiations with
other powers to check it.

Woaehouse speaking for the government

stated that the United States as an independent nation would have
resented any suggestion from Great Britain, and that Lyons had been
instructed to be extremely careful about offering advice unless
asked for by the contending parties.-

On May 1, Dallas learned of

a plan of Joint action with France, though what action was planned
was not clear.

Dallas further reported that the representatives of

the Confederacy were in England and that Bussell was not unwilling
to meet them unofficially, and that there would be some understand
ing between the British and the French governments.

When Bussell

mentioned the rumor that the southern ports were to be blockaded,
Dallas informed him that the new minister would arrive in less than
twro weeks.

Bussell replied " The coming of Adams

would doubtless

be regarded as the natural and appropriate occasion for finally dis
cussing and determining the question."0
On May 3, the Attorney General, replying to a query of Lord
Bussell in regard to the recognition of belligerency of the South
and as to the right of the South to issue letters of marque and re
prisal, stated that Southern privateering would be dangerous to
British commerce but that nothing could be done about it.

"The

best solution," said the Attorney Seneral, Bethell, "would be for
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the European nations to determine that the war between the two Con
federacies shall be carried on on the principles of 'justum bellum'
and shall be conducted according to the rules of the Treaty of
Paris.

Recognize the Southern States as belligerents on this con

dition only.”6
The previous day Lord Russell expressed the official position of
the British government when he said in the House of Commons:
"Her Majesty's Government has felt it was its duty to use
every possible means to avoid taking part in the lamentable
contest now raging in the American States. Nothing but the
imperative duty of protecting British interests in case they
be attacked justifies the government in at all interfering.
We have not been involved in any way in that contest by any
act or giving any advice in the matter, and for God's sake,
let us, if possible, keep out of iti"^
On May 6, it was stated that according to precedent the Southern
states must be recognized as belligerents.

Russell, quoting the

government policy in 1825, said:
"The character of belligerence was not so much a principle
as a fact; that a certain degree of force and consistency,
acquired by any mass of population to be treated as a bel
ligerent, and, even if the title were questionable, must
render it the interest well understood of civilized nations
so to treat them. A power or a community which was at war
with another, and which covered the sea with its cruisers,
must either be acknowledged as a belligerent or dealt with
as a pirate."8
According to those principles the law officers of the Crown came to
the decision that the Southern states must be granted belligerent
rights.
According to that decision of the law officers, it was announces
that it was the contemplation of Her Majesty's government to issue
a proclamation for the purpose of cautioning all her subjects against
any interference in the hostilities between the Northern and the
Southern States of America.

The general principle of the British

law was that no British subject shall enter into the service of any
foreign prince or power, or engage in any hostilities that may be
carried on between any two foreign states.^
On May 10, after pointing out that many seamen would be at
tracted by the various inducements of privateering, the Earl of
Derby remarked, "that they should know upon what footing they stand
with respect to their rights as British subjects.

I need not say

that the offence of entering upon this privateering service is an
offence against the Foreign Enlistment Act."10
On May 13, the Queen's proclamation of neutrality was official
ly announced.

The discussion in the House of lords on ^ay 16 brings

out clearly the general consensus of opinion and the policy of the
government in respect to the proclamation.

The South was definitely

recognized as a belligerent only, and the decision in regard to re
cognition of independence of the South was to be left to the future.
The right of the South to send out privateers was recognized as law
ful, and such privateers could not be regarded as pirates and could
not be punished as such by the Federal Government.

If the Federal

Government decided to treat them as such in defiance of internation-jal opinion, Great Britain had at least warned her subjects that they
had no claim to protection if engaged in the service of the South.
A blockade, it was declared, must be effective to be respected, at
least to the point where a vessel attempting to pass through was
likely to be captured.

The Earl of dllenborough said in the House

of lords that the plan of blockading the entire southern coast was
on the face of it impossible.

11

Adams reached London on the evening of May 13, the very day on

which the British Cabinet decided to recognize the Southern states
as belligerents.

This did not seem to him to be a very propitious

beginning of his mission.

Dallas had been instructed by Seward to

use all proper and necessary measures to prevent recognition of the
insurgents, and after an interview reported to Seward that no action
would be taken before the arrival of Adams.

This was understood by

the American Secretary of State as a pledge that no official action
would be taken until that time.

Under these circumstances it seemed

to Adams when he learned of the Queen’s Proclamation that the govern
12
ment had acted with animus and precipitately.
Adams felt that it
was unfriendly and discourteous.

This feeling was intensified by

the knowledge that a few days previous, Russell had received the
Southern commissioners, although "unofficially.”13

It was on the

point of undue haste that the criticism of the British government
■was based and not on their legal right to recognize the belligerency
of the South.

Russell denied that he had made a pledge that no ac

tion would be taken until Adams arrived to take up official duties.
;Russell insisted that he meant to say that England would not commit
itself as regards the recognition of the independence of the South
ern states. 14
In his first interview with Russell, Adams said that it was
"not without pain" that he was compelled to admit that the opinion
in Parliament, in the ministry, and in prevailing society showed
much uncertainty in regard to preserving the friendly relations be
tween the two nations.

He regretted, he said, the decision of the

|Queen’s Proclamation which raised the insurgents to the level of a
belligerent state.

Russell replied that in question of fact a war

existed and under the circumstances it was impossible to avoid speak
ing of a 1justurn helium' and that the intention was to bring the
management of it within the rule of modern civilized warfare.

^t

was designed to show the purpose of existing laws and explain to the
British subjects their liability in case they should enter the war.
Adams thought that the "action was a little more rapid than was ab
solutely called for."

It pronounced the insurgents to be belliger

ents before they had shown their capacity to maintain warfare.

It

considered them a marine power before they had a single ship upon
the ocean.15

Many similar representations containing these same

arguments were made by Adams and Seward throughout the war and after
ward.
Seward, writing under the misapprehension of the report of
Dallas, said in his instructions:
"Her Britannic Majesty's government is at liberty to choose
whether it will retain the friendship of this government by
refusing all aid and comfort to its enemies, now in flagrant
rebellion against it, as we think the treaties existing be
tween the two countries require, or whether her Majesty's
government will take the precarious benefits of a different
course."15
After carrying out these instructions Adams was able to report an
improvement in the attitude of the British government which he
thought was due to the vigor which was being shown by the national
government and in part to a realization by the British government
that their earlier actions had meant more than they intended they
should.17

Henry Adams wrote:

"The English are really on our side; of that I have no
doubt whatever. But they thought that as a dissolution
seemed inevitable, and as we seemed to have made up our
minds to it, that their proclamation was just the thing
to keep them straight with both sides, and when it turned
out otherwise, they did their best to correct their mistakes ft18

7
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John Bright, an ardent friend of the iforth, thought that the
method of his government rather than the deed was to be regretted.
It was unfortunate that the Cabinet had taken action since the new
minister was announced and on his way and that it seemed to be done
with ’’unfriendly haste.”

”It gave comfort and courage to the con

spiracy.... and caused grief and irritation among.... the people of
America £who are]' desirous of maintaining friendly relations."1^
Speaking later in the United States Senate, Sumner distinguished
between belligerency on land and belligerency on sea, and pointed
out that England created a sea power since no power previously had
existed on the sea as far as the Southern states were concerned.

20

The United States government based its contentions on the be
lief that war did not exist in the international sense.

The govern

ment had not relinquished its sovereignty over the Southern states.
To them the struggle was carried on by insurgents, and foreign na
tions did not have the right to take official recognition of them.
In meeting those contentions Russell pointed out that ’’the
state

of things which exists is a state of civil war; and there is,

as regards neutral nations, no difference between civil and foreign
wars.”21

Lincoln, it was said, acknowledged the situation of pub

lic war when he spoke of the blockade "in pursuance of the law of
nations.”

The Supreme Court of the United States declared that the

president’s proclamation of the blockade itself was "official and
conclusive evidence to the court that a state of war existed

and

confirmed as valid all prize and vessels found guilty of violating
the proclamation.22

Lord Russell thought it quite inappropriate to

speak of "unlawful combinations” when the president was calling for

8

400,000 men and 400,000,000 of dollars.^3

Earl Derby said: "The^

northern States can not he entitled to claim the rights of belli
gerents for themselves, and treat the Southern States, not as belligerents, but as rebels."

Later, speaking of the matter in 1865,

Lord Palmerston said that "the admission of belligerent rights for
the South was the result rather of necessity than of choice."2^
Recent writers on the subject substantiate this position of
Palmerston and hold that the recognition of belligerency was "simply
the natural, direct, and prompt notification to British subjects re
quired in the presence of a de facto war."

C. F. Adams, Jr. came

to the conclusion in his father's biography that the' issuance of
the declaration before the arrival of Adams was most fortunate. Eis
instructions were based on the Lincoln-Seward theory that the for
eign nations had no concern in the local insurrection.

The British

based their claims on the proclamations of Davis and of Lincoln
which recognized the de facto war.
hypothesis

Adams suggests as a possible

that the protest which Minister Adams planned to make

would have resulted in an immediate rupture, and that, had England
delayed this recognition until after the victory of the South at
Bull Run, the consequences might have been the immediate recognition of the South as an independent state.

26

The Foreign Enlistment Act which was largely the subject of
the Queen's proclamation of May 15, 1861 forbade subjects to "be
concerned in the equipping, furnishing, fitting out, or arming of
any vessel, with intent or in order that such ship or vessel shall
be employed in the service" of a belligerent, and provided for

punishment of individuals and forfeiture of vessels if the prohibi
tion were disobeyed.

The act further declared, however, that pun

ishment or seizure would follow only upon due proof of the offence. 27
Bullock, the principal Confederate agent in Europe, had consulted
i

eminent English counsel and had been informed that it was no of
fence under the act merely to build a ship without arming and equip
ping it.

This was the construction which had been placed upon the

act by the British officials and courts.

28

In its program of build

ing war ships in British ports the Confederate government adopted
a policy which enabled them to conceal the ownership and destina*
tion of their ships. They were careful to arm these ships and
29
equip them outside British waters.
Early in 1862 Adams began protesting to lord Bussell in regard
to the steamers which were being fitted out in British ports with
the intention of breaking the Southern blockade.

On February 18,

1862 Adams reported to Bussell as follows: "An armed steamer is be
ing prepared with evident intention for hostile operations on the
ocean.

From the evidence furnished.... I entertain little doubt

that the intention is precisely.... the carrying on of war against
the United States."

Adams pointed out that the parties involved

had previously succeeded in running the blockade, and offered to
30
procure further evidence if it were needed.
Bussell referred the
letter to the Commissioner of Customs at Liverpool who reported
that the destination of the vessel was Palermo, that she was not at
the time fitted for the reception of guns, that the builders of the
vessel were not of the opinion that she was to be fitted with guns
whilst she remained in the country, that she was intended for the

Italian government, and that orders had been given to watch the
movement of the vessel.^

On March 25, Adams pointed out to lord

Russell that the duty of friendly nations was not to permit their
good faith to be violated by the ill-disposed persons because "the
existing municipal laws are found to be insufficient, and do not
furnish the means of prevention adequate to the emergency."32

To

Seward, Adams wrote that Russell had been deluded by what he (Adams)
could not help thinking was "the willful blindness and credulous
partiality of the British authorities."

&e had no confidence that

application to Russell would! meet with success, but he did so "to
perpetuate testimony for future use.”^
In a conference with Russell, Adams was informed that the au
thorities at Liverpool had reported that there was no ground for
doubting the legality of the voyage of the ship in question. Adams
replied that this was exactly what gave such unpleasant impressions
to the people in America.

He said:

"The Oreto, by the very papers furnished from the custom
house, was shown to be laden with a hundred and seventy
tons of arms, and to have persons called 1troops *on board,
destined for Palermo and Jamaica.... The factsof her
true destination were notorious all over Liverpool."'3
He said again: "In spite of the admission that troops and guns are
on board, Her Majesty's Government still insist(ed) upon being blind
to the destination of the vessel, and the government tolerates the
abuse.
On June 13, 1862, Adams wrote Russell that it was necessary of
apprising his lordship that a new and still more powerful war steam
er was nearly ready for departure from the port of Liverpool on the
same errand as the Oreto, later called the Florida,

^e went on to

11

say that it was being built in the dock-yard ownecTTy BritifiT^suS1
^
jects, one of whom was a member of Parliament, and that it was fitted
out with the manifest purpose of carrying on hostilities at sea. It
was to be commanded by the same insurgent agent as sailed in the
Oreto, and that a letter from the agents had been intercepted which
fully explained the situation.

He added:

"It is my duty to solicit such action as may tend either
to stop the projected expedition or to establish the fact
that its purpose was not inimical to the people of the
United States."36
Russell referred the matter, to the proper department of Her Majesty'
government.

A report from the custom-house showed nothing to be

amiss about the vessel.

The report further stated that there had

oeen no attempt to disguise the fact that the vessel was a ship of
jwar, that she had neither guns nor carriages, though she did have
powder canisters.

The officers had ascertained that she was built

for a foreign government.

The builders were not disposed to answer

questions regarding its destination.

Beyond this the customs offi

cers had no other reliable information. Since there was at that
I
time not sufficient.evidence to warrant detention of the vessel, the
custom officers would wait for evidence from the consul before tak
ing further action.

Without sufficient evidence to justify them

selves, the officers who seized the vessel might entail on themselves
and their government serious consequences.

rzn

In a note to Adams, dated July 12, 1862, Seward wrote as follows:
"Since the Oreto and other gunboats are being received by
the insurgents from Europe to renew demonstrations on our
national commerce, Congress is about to authorize the is
sue of letters of marque and reprisal and that if we find
it necessary to suppress that piracy, we shall bring

12

privateers into service„£or that purpose, and of course,
for that purpose only."0
Russell acknowledged the protests of Adams from time to time
and assured him that his complaints were being referred to.ithe pro40
per department of government.
In spite of the fact that the fore
man in Messrs, laird's yard said she was the sister to the gunboat
Oreto and had been built for the same parties and for the same pur
pose the officials at Liverpool shut their eyes to facts that were
41
notorious.
On July 16, 1862, Adams received from Collier, the Queen's eoun^ s e l , an opinion so decided that he (Adams) directed our consul at
Liverpool to proceed with utmost vigor in the preparation of deposiAO

tions to place before the collector of customs there. ^

In this

first opinion, Collier considered the evidence almost conclusive
that the vessel in question was intended for the Confederate govern
ment as a privateer,

-“e felt that the matter was so urgent that he

advised the principal officer of the customs at Liverpool to seize
the vessel with a view of condemnation, and at the same time to lay
the facts before the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

He

advised immediate action by the commissioner of customs, since the
government might not unreasonably take some little time to consider
what course to pursue, and in the meantime the vessel might escape.
On July 23, Collier handed down a second opinion in which he
said that it was the duty of the collector of customs to detain the
vessel.

He said, "If he allows the vessel to leave Liverpool, he

will incur heavy responsibility.... It appears difficult to make
out a stronger case of infringement of the Foreign Rnlistment Act,

43
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which, if not enforced on this occasion, is little better then a
4-4dead letter,”
This opinion with eight affidavits was presented to Lord Rus
sell on the 26th of July,

The most damaging deposition, and the

only one that was considered conclusive rather than mere hearsay
evidence, was that of Passmore whose testimony was borne out by
four other persons.

Passmore was a seaman who had been enlisted by

the southern agent,

^e stated: "that she had a magazine, shot, and

canister racks on deck, and was pierced for guns, and was built and
fitted up as a fighting ship in all respects.”

The deposition went

on to prove the connection of the agent of the Confederate govern
ment, Captain Bullock, with this vessel as superintending her con
struction.

The document closed with these words: "It is well known

by the hands on board that the vessel is going out as a privateer
for the Confederate government to act against the United States under
a commission from ^r. ^efferson Davis."4^
Endless representations followed offering proof of what every
one knew.

Squarey, Dudley's counsel, obtained an interview with

layard, the Under-Secretary for the Foreign Department, and from a
report of the conversation which he sent to Adams, it appears that
he represented the urgency of the case and pressed for a speedy de
cision.46

Dudley presented strong circumstantial evidence, but the

customs collector demanded ocular proof, which could not be fur
nished.47

Adams then sent "another communication to Lord Russell

so that the refusal to act may be made as marked as possible."

48

The papers submitted by Adams to Russell were referred b.y the
latter to the law officers of the Crown.

They lay for five days at

&

the home of the Queen's advocate, who had been striken with an
illness from which he never recovered.
in.

Other advisers were called

On July 29 orders to hold the vessel were telegraphed to liver

pool.

It was too late.

She order had been anticipated and careful

plans had been laid to evade it.

With a party of guests on board

to cover up her real purpose, and under the pretence of making a
trial trip, the Alabama steamed down the Mersey and stood out to
sea.

She guests were sent back on a tug, but the Alabama did not

return.

She met her consort at a designated rendezvous, where the

Alabama took on stores, arms, and munitions and proceeded on her
49
career as a commerce destroyer.
Shough the Alabama was still near the Welsh coast, where she
remained from 7;S0 P.M. on July 29 to 3 A.L. July 31, upward of 31
hours, collecting her crew and making ready for her long journey,
no attempt was put forth by the authorities of the port to reach
her.

"A lamentable proceeding," John Morley called it, "for which

the want of alacrity and common sense at the Foreign Office and th^
bias or blundering of the customs agents at Liverpool may divide
the grave discredit."

*50

ilussell himself recoiled as he contemplated the consequences of
the course in permitting this vessel to escape.

With the support

of the Puke of Argyll, he had drawn up a despatch directing colon
ial authorities to detain the ship if she came within their reach.
When the subject was brought before the cabinet, all the others
C"l
were against it. The measure had to be a b a n d o n e d . " T h e r e was
a perfect insurrection," wrote Lord Russell.
The friends of the Union strongly condemned the negligence of

15

the customs authorities and the government.

Baring in the House of

Commons said, "The law officers had been dilatory.

It was unfor

tunate that the government.... should he so badly represented by
those whose duty it was to carry those laws into effect that the
customs authorities were not aware what was going on."

rxe contended

that the vessel would have been seized if the proper precautions
52
had been taken.
One point on which information was required,
Forster said:
"Was as to the steps the customs authorities had taken to
find out the truth or falsehood of the American minister's
statements... The House ought to know how it was that the
customs authorities, whose duty it was to prevent the breach
of the law, independently of the Foreign Office and the
American government, took no steps in the matter."
He pressed further accusations against the officials.

He said: They

"were acting in some respects on the wrong principle; for they
seemed to suppose that it was not their business to put it (the
Foreign Enlistment Act) in force until the American government took
action in the matter."

53

He saw the question- not as a matter of

sympathy as between the Horth and the South.

J"Le held that :"It was

a question of obedience to a British law, and carrying out a Brit
ish act, the preamble of which said that the equipping or fitting
out of vessels in British ports was to be prevented because it was
prejudicial and calculated to endanger the peace and welfare of
the kingdom."^4

He said further:

"It appears that the representations of the American
minister had merely the effect of warning the owner
that it was necessary that she should sail at once.
It certainly is a curious coincidence that the day
that the opinion of the law officers was received was
the very day that the vessel got away.... notwithstand
ing the suspicions attached to her, the customs author
ities did not find out that this pleasure excursion was
her actual departure."55

Forster concluded by expressing the hope that: "surely the govern
ment would do their utmost to preserve the neutrality from being
violated by private interests in order to put money into the pockets
of a few ship-owners and contractors, however wealthy they may be or
however high their stations."*^

Cobden wrote to Gladstone that "the

spirit of pride and self-sufficiency of the merchant classes" was
responsible for the

CM

Alabama's escape.°

The ministers defended themselves on the grounds that there had
not been sufficient evidence; that no arrests could be made on mere
suspicion and accusations of a foreign minister.

In the debate they

evaded the real issue and hid behind the question of selling muni
tions and enlistment of men.

The North was really obtaining more

assistance of this nature than the South did, they said.

Grounds

for complaint, they went on, would exist only if the government it
self were concerned in fitting out such a belligerent ship, or if
the government permitted the belligerent to carry on operations on
58
their shores and in their waters.
Bussell officially disclaimed
for the British government any responsibility for the escape, but
he wrote to Lyons: "I must feel that her roaming the ocean with
English ships and English sailors to burn, sink and destroy the
ships of a friendly nation is a scandal and a reproach."0

Russell

said in the debate: "A learned judge has said that we might drive,
not a coach and six, but a whole fleet oi ships tnrough that act
of Parliament," and he thought that the lav; ought to be made more
clear and intelligible.60

But again he writes that the law is suf-

ficient if legal evidence can be obtained.

61
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The escape of the Alabama encouraged the Confederate agents.
The road seemed clear for building an unlimited number of ships in
the British shipyards.
Shortly before the Alabama left the port of Liverpool, Bullock
had contracted with the Lairds at Birkenhead for two ironclad shipsof-war to be built; and by the middle of July the work on both ships
was begun. 6^

These vessels v/ere of the most advanced design of the

times, and equipped with steel rams which were clearly designed to
break the blockade.

They caused great consternation at Washington.

The assistant secretary of the IJavy wrote to Adams: "You must stop
them [the Laird ramsj at all hazards as we have no defense against
them....

63
It is a question of life and death.” .

Shortly after the news was received at Washington that these
iron-clad rams were being planned, a bill was introduced into Con
gress authorizing the president to issue letters of marque and re
prisal.

This occurred in July, 1862, and on the twelfth, Seward

wrote to Adams of the proposed measures, specifying that the purpose
was to permit privateers to seek for and capture or destroy the
Alabama and other vessels of a like type.

He characterized tjiis as

a plan "to organize the militia of the seas by issuing letters of
marque and reprisal.'*64

Though the bill was introduced in the sum

mer of 1862, it was not taken seriously until February, 1863.
In the Senate discussion of the bill at the time of introduction, Senator Grimes, its sponsor, declared that the object was to
encourage privateers to pursue British ships when they should "turn
Confederate."

It would give the president the power to protect the

nation against "insolence of a foreign power."

Sumner objected

18

that the true business of privateers was to destroy enemy commerce
and the South had no such commerce.

Grimes agreed that this was his

opinion also, but explained that the administration wanted the meas
ure passed so that it might have in its hands a power to be used if
the need arose.

The majority of the Senate was opposed to taking

action at this time and the matter was permitted to lapse, but with
out definite action, so that it could be called up again at any
65
time.
The bill again came before the Senate in January 1863, was
referred to the committee, reported out, and passed on February 17.
The House of Representatives passed the bill without debate. Grimes
now clearly expressed the need for the bill because the Confederates
"are now building in England a fleet of vessels designed to break
our blockade of their coast" and that privateers were to assist in
maintaining the blockade.

66

In the cabinet, opinion was divided on the question of issuing
letters of marque and reprisal.

Seward and Chase were in favor of

it, but Welles was strongly opposed since he feared that it would
involve us in war with England.

Seward later presented two messages

from Russell which Welles said were "insolent, contemptuous, and
meant agression if not war," and he was inclined to believe that
the letters of marque would be useful as an admonition to England.
lord Lyons feared that the measure would be misapprehended
abroad.

Seward's letter to Adams explaining the nature of the bill

was vague.

He said that the executive would have discretion in put

ting the act in force, and there would be entire frankness to
"avoid any surprise on the part of friendly nations whose commerce
ft 68

might be incidentally and indirectly affected."

19

Lyons pointed out to Seward the bad effect which the applica- I
tion of the act would have upon Europe.

Seward replied: "i ome

remedy must be found for the fact that"} the law did not appear to
enable the British government to prevent” the issue of Confederate
privateers from their ports and added that the departure of any
more armed vessels from English ports was a thing to be deprecated
above all things.69
On March 8, Seward sent Lyons a letter in which he pointed out
that peace oould not be preserved without the best intention on the
part of the British government to enforce its laws.

Lyons protes

ted vigorously to the letters of marque and implied that war would
result.

Seward replied that he was aware of the inconvenience and

danger resulting from the act, and that he would be glad to delay
using it; but '’that unless some intelligence came from England to
70
allay the public exasperation, the measure would be unavoidable.”
Lyons was much alarmed.

Seward informed him of instructions

which had been sent to Adams to inform Russell of the delicacy of
the situation, and to ask for assurance that no further vessels
would escape from British ports.

The privateering bill would be

put in force unless such escapes could be prevented by the British
neutrality act. 71
In the early months of 1863, matters were rapidly coming to a
head in both America and England.

The question of the letters of

marque was before the American cabinet, and nfelles, who had previous
ly opposed the measure, was affected by the unfavorable reports re
garding the intentions of Great Britain.

It was decided to post72
pone action until further information was received from England.
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The newspapers encouraged by Seward were fanning excitement to a
V1
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blaze.
In England a feeling was beginning to manifest itself that the
ministry had been lax in regard to the Alabama.

Merchants were com

ing to realize that their interests were opposed to those of the
ship-builders.
discussed.

Meetings were held and the matter was vigorously

Resolutions were passed which condemned the allowed

building and fitting out of vessels-of-war in English ports.74
Adams noted a friendlier feeling in a speech which lord Russell
made in Parliament on March 23, and reported "that it was the most
satisfactory of all the speeches he has made since I have been at
this post."
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Russell further advised Palmerston that he might safe

ly say in the coming debate that "the government disapprove all such
attempts to elude our law with a view to assist one of the belligerients."76

Adams reported that the government was really better dis

posed to exertion, and seemed better sustained for action by public
77
sentiment than ever before.
At this time Russell wrote to Lyons:
"I must feel that her £the Alabama} roaming the ocean with English
guns and English sailors to burn, sink, and destroy, the ships of a
friendly nation is. a scandal and a reproach."7®
Cobden wrote:
"I have every reason to know that our government fully
appreciates the gravity of this matter, lord Russell,
whatever may be the tone of his despatches, is sincerely
alive to the necessity of putting an end to the equipping
of ships-of-war in our harbours to be used against the^
Federal government by the Confederates. He was bona fide
in his desire to prevent the Alabama from leaving; but he
was tricked and was angry at the escape of that vessel."
On April 2, 1863 Cobden again wrote to Sumner saying that he had
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urged Russell to be more than passive in enforcing the law.

It was

suspected that some ships supposed to be for the Chinese government
were really for the Confederates.
gate.

Cobden urged Russell to investi

Russell had replied that he had already done so and Cobden

seemed satisfied. ^

Cobden wrote: "[England^] now begins to under

stand that she has acted illegally in applauding those who furnished
ships-of-war to prey on your commerce.

IJb will not hapjien again."
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On March 27, 1865, the merits of the Foreign Enlistment Act
were debated in Parliament.

Forster, who led the debate, brought

forth two questions for consideration; first, "whether Her Majesty's
government had done everything it could to prevent these breaches
of the law;" and second, "whether they were impressed with the neces
sity of the duty of doing their utmost to prevent them in the fu
ture."

He called on the ministers to explain the violation of the

Foreign Enlistment Act and to offer some pledge for the future.

He

asserted that the government should have acted on its own initiative
and hinted at complicity in the escape of the Alabama.

These vigor

ous attacks were carried on against the government by Bright and
Baring.

Instead of making the favorable reply which had been ad

vised by Russell and expected by Adams, Palmerston was forced to
defend the government and asserted the correctness of the govern
mental procedure.

The act was held sufficient in itself, he said,

but direct evidence was not always obtainable.

Ho pledge was made

for the future.^
Adams was disappointed by the results of the debate.

In re

porting to Seward he said he regretted "that the substance of it
should fall so short of what I had been led to expect."

83

22

The defects of the Foreign Enlistment Act being apparent, Adams
tvas directed to ask the British minister to provide the required
remedy by act of parliament, but this he refused to do.

Russell said

in reply: "Mr. Adams said that his government would listen to any
proposition Eer Majesty's government had to make, but they did not
see how their own law on the subject could be improved.
the cabinet had come to a similar conclusion.”®^

I said that

"With respect to

the law itself,” replied Adams, "either it was sufficient for the
purpose of neutrality, and then let the British government enforce
it; or it was insufficient, and then let the British government ap
ply to Parliament to amend it."

Russell answered that the law was

sufficient but the evidence was not always to be procured.88
It was learned that other warships were being built.

Adams was

instructed to attempt by judicial proceedings to arrest the departure
of the vessels.
the matter.

Evarts was sent to England to confer with Adams in

The British government decided to detain the Alexandra

and to order prosecution of the persons concerned, although, as Adams
said, the ministry would have to breast a good deal of opposition ar
.86
subject themselves to heavy responsibilities if they should fail.
That the Alexandra was being built with a view to warlike equip
ment was beyond doubt, and it was a moral certainty that she was xor
use in the Confederate service.

In instructing the jury, the Lord

Chief Baron stated that the act was not designed for the protection
of belligerent powers or to prevent Great Britain being made the oa$e
of naval operations.87

The purpose of the act was solely to prevent

hostile jjaval encounters in British waters; and that it forbade equip
ment merely to prevent immediate hostile operations.

The judge fur
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ther instructed the jury that a neutral might make a vessel and arm
it, and then offer it for sale to a belligerent, and so also he
might execute an order for it.

A belligerent might buy muskets, can

non, gunpowder or ammunition, so why should ships be an exception?
Under such an interpretation of the statute the jury rendered a ver
dict for the defendants.

The government promptly appealed the

decision.88
Bussell hoped the orders given to watch and stop vessels appar
ently intended for the Confederate service would allay the strong
feelings which had arisen in the United States by the escape from
justice of the Oreto and the Alabama.
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Adams concluded that the construction placed upon the Foreign
Enlistment Act left nothing of it as a penal measure; even though
the ship would remain under interdict, and there would be no relax
ation of the efforts on the part of the government to check the progress of the steamers yet building.
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On July 11, Seward sent a despatch to Adams in which he ex
pressed satisfaction that the British government had seen fit to at
tempt to stop the fitting out of armed vessels to prey upon the com
merce of the United States.

He went on to say that it was now under

stood in this country that there was no law in Great Britain which
would be effective to stop the outrages.
statute be revised.

He suggested that the

If this were not done, he said:

**There would be left for the United States no alternative
but to protect themselves and their commerce against armed
cruisers.....and to insist upon indemnities.... To this
end this government is now preparing a naval force with
the utmost vigor; and if the national navy shall not be
sufficient.....the United States must bring into employ
ment such private armed naval forces as the mercantile
marine shall afford. it 91
was a strong despatch, but Adams, exercising his disoret ion.

did not communicate the threat directly to Russell.

Since there

was no enemy commerce, Seward could only mean to use the privateers
as a cruising squadron.

He did find opportunity to say to the Duke

of Argyle, who was a member of the cabinet, that the situation was
"grave and critical,” and that his instructions were far more string92
ent than any he had yet received.
Throughout July and August the correspondence on the rams con
tinued with Dudley and Adams sending evidence and depositions to
Russell.

Twice Adams had supplied to the law officers of the Grown

what he believed sufficient evidence to justify the seizure of the
vessels, but received replies that this was no evidence capable of
being presented to a court of justice.

Adams remonstrated and said:

"A war has thus been practically conducted by a portion of her
people against a Government with which Her Majesty is under the
most solemn of all national engagements to preserve a lasting and
durable peace."9®
Adams was becoming uneasy, for he felt that the law-officers
were wavering on the point of evidence in regard to intent, which
Adams thought conclusive.

The doubt in the mind of the officers was
94
as to the point of destination which was skilfully concealed.
The building continued, and the second ram was launched. Adams
reported on September 3, that the first was so far prepared for de
parture as to bring the question of stopping her to a point calling
for prompt decision.95

Russell sent a note saying that the informa

tion contained in the depositions was mere hearsay, that the ships
were for Bravay of France, that the depositions did not prove any
infraction of the law, but that careful watch would be kept over
th.m-96_________ __________________________________________
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Adams then replied that both countries would be placed in a
grave situation if an act of aggression were committed against the
government and the people of the United States by either of these
formidable vessels.

qn

On September 5, 1863 Seward wrote to Adams: "The nation, after
two years of experience in war has overcome the sense of fear, while
its temper is highly excited.

It believes that, though found unpre

pared, there are no limits to its ultimate ability to defend it
self."98
On the same day Adams replied to Russell’s note of the previous
day.

It contained plain prophecy of an early rupture of friendly

relations between the two countries.

He said that no nation retain

ing a proper degree of self respect could tamely submit to such in
dignities and added the ambiguous statement, "It would be superflu99
ous in me to point out to your lordship that tliis is war."
In the meantime, however, unknown to Adams, the decision had
been reached by the government to detain the rams.

On the third,

Layard wrote to the treasury department desiring that they should
be stopped.

On the same day Russell wrote to Palmerston: "The con

duct of the gentlemen who have contracted for the ironclads at Birki*
enhead is so suspicious that I have thought it necessary to direct
that they be detained."100

While the decision was reached on the

third, the matter was still under correspondence with the Lairds
until the eighth, the government attempting to get conclusive evi
dence regarding the ownership of the vessel.181

The Solicitor-

General concurred in the action as one of policy, though not of
strict law.

The two ironclads were finally purchased by the
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government.
Thus was the crisis in this controversy during the Civil War
passed.

Benjamin, Secretary of State for the Confederacy, grudgingly

paid Seward this compliment:
"It is impossible not to admire the sagacity with which
Mr. Seward penetrated into the secret feelings of the
British Cabinet, and the success of his policy of in
timidation which the world at large supposed would be
met with prompt resentment, but which he with deeper in
sight into the real policy of that Cabinet foresaw woul&n?
be followed by submissive acquiescence in his demands."10*
To a great extent the success was due to the tact and diplomacy of
Charles Francis Adams.

The change in the foreign policy of Great

Britain during the Civil War was due to several factors.
in Europe were far from reassuring.

Affairs

The feelings of Great Britain

were deeply enlisted on the behalf of Denmark as against the com
bined force of Austria and Prussia.
in the American controversy.

This, no doubt, had its weight

The Post wrote:

"We may be at war ourselves; we have a future to which to
look forward, and we must keep in mind the precept which
inculcates the necessity of doing to others as we would
be done by...... Ship-owners of Liverpool are considering
what is to become of their property should we unhappily
become involved in war, and innumerable Alabamas issue
from neutral ports to prey upon British commerce."103
Cobden in a letter to Gladstone pointed out what the consequences
would be if "by entering a war with a maritime power we give American
Lairds an opportunity of supplying a belligerent with Alabamas to
prey on our commerce which they will certainly do."10^
a similar vein to M. Arles Dufour.105

He wrote in

In Parliament, Lefevre said:

"Only the other day when were supposed to be on the verge of a war
with German, (I) saw it stated in the papers that some of the German
States..... were prepared to adopt the principle of the Alabama and
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to fit our privateers in neutral ports.
Public opinion was gradually turning in favor of the United
States, especially after the Emancipation Proclamation was issued.
This is shown by the memorials and resolutions sent to Parliament
and to the American minister.

107

Recent successes on the battlefront helped to shape the opinion
of governmental ministers.

John Bright observed: "Attorney-general

and lord Palmerston spoke in language very different from that used
last year.

As the United States government shows signs of strength

and of coming success, so our government becomes more civil.

Their

conduct is guided by some other principle than that of honour and
magnanimity.

08

Cobden wrote:

"lord Robert Cecil said, rather smartly, that our Foreign
Office had a tariff of manners for other countries, regu
lated according to their power. He might have added that
we have a different manner for the same Power, according
as it may be weak or strong. It is only because the North
has had great successes since July that the British lion
is becoming so lamb-like towards it.,,1U9
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CHAPTER II
Early negotiations in the Controversy
Claims against Great Britain for the destruction of American
commerce were presented by Adams to the British Foreign Office as
they arose.1

Adams was instructed to obtain two effects in his

early negotiations: "first, due redress for the national and pri
vate injuries sustained; and, secondly, a prevention of such law
less and injurious proceedings hereafter.1,2

It was not the inten

tion of the United States to harass Great Britain with repeated de
mands for immediate reparation, but it was evident that such fla
grant cases as that of the Alabama could not be left to be allowed
to pass without vigorous and continued protest.^

To our repeated

claims Russell replied that, "much as Her Majesty’s government de
sire to prevent such occurrences, they are unable to go beyond the
law, municipal and international."4
Although Russell disclaimed all responsibility for damages,
Adams continued to present them, and he reported to Seward that
"Lord Russell is becoming a little sensitive to the multiplication
5

of the claims for damage done by the Alabama."

Indeed, Russell

had previously expressed his hope that Adams "may not be instructed
again to put forward claims which Her Majesty’s government cannot
0
admit to be founded on any ground of law or justice."
Seward declined to cease presenting further claims, saying,
however, "that the United States does not intend to act dogmatically
or in a litigious spirit.... This government confesses very freely
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that it does not regard the present hour as one that is entirely
favorable to a calm and oandid examination of the facts and prin
ciples involved.”

Nevertheless it looked forward to the period

when the interests and passions aroused by the war have subsided anc.
disappeared.

He insisted on a policy of presenting claims for fu

ture use, if for no other purpose. The government of the United
I
States declared itself disposed at all times to consider all the
'
evidence and the arguments; and Seward said; "There is no fair and
equitable form of Conventional arbitration or reference to which
they will not be willing to submit.” ^

This is the first tentative

proposal for arbitration made on the part of the United States to
the British government.

It was offered as a suggestion to be taken

into consideration at some future period.

It was made in October

1863, and no further reference was made to it until two years later.
At the close of the Civil War public opinion in the United
States was in favor of forcing some kind of a settlement and was
not at all disposed to be conciliatory or even reasonable.

There

were two other subjects of dispute, antedating the Civil War, w'hich
were to be adjusted if cordial relations were to be preserved.

One

was the San Juan water boundary between the island of "Vancouver and
the mainland, which had been described in indefinite terms in the
treaty of 1846, and upon which no agreement had since been reached.
The question at issue was whether the boundary should be the chan0
nel to the east or that to the west of San Juan Island.
The other question arose out of the decision of the United
States to terminate the Canadian reciprocity and xtisixexies uonven- ,
tion of 1854.

The twelve months’ notice required by the terms of
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the convention was given to England on Larch 17, 1865,

The treaty

was never regarded with favor, hut the main impulse to the denuncia-'
tion of it seems to spring from the general hostility to England.
r

A threat was made by Seward to terminate the Rush-3agot agree
ment of 1817 establishing disarmament on the Great lakes, but the
g
demand was not pushed.
On Lay 20, 1865, Adams sent a note to -bus8ell in which he
maintained that British recognition of the insurgents was precipi
tate and unprecedented; that the effect of the act of recognition
was to create belligerency on the part of the Southern states in
stead of acknowledging an existing fact, and he said that the ap
pearance of the ocean belligerency on the part of the insurgents
was in the shape of British built, equipped, and British manned
vessels.

He went on to say that the ministers, while they desired

to check the abuses, refused to procure the additional power which
would enable them to do so; that property belonging to the people
of the United States had been destroyed as a result of the inaction
of the British government; that the commercial marine of the United
States had been driven from the sea; and that injuries were of so
grave a nature as to constitute a valid claim for reparation and
indemnification.^
Russell maintained that he could not admit that the duties
of Great Britain toward the United States were to be measured by
the losses which the trade and commerce of the United States may
have sustained.

’’The question is,” he wrote, "whether in difficult

and extraordinary circumstances the government of her Majesty have

3(i

performed faithfully and honestly the duties” which international
law and their own municipal law impose upon them.

He maintained

that the United States government by the blockade had recognized
belligerency first, and that the British government had performed
its duty in the case of the Alabama.11
On August 30, 1865, when the war was over, Russell felt that
"the time was favorable for a calm and candid examination of the
facts and principles involved."

He, therefore, recalled to Adams

that the United States had expressed itself in favor of any "fair
and equitable form of conventional arbitrament or reference."

In

referring to this proposal, he said that there were but two ques
tions by which the claim for compensation could be tested: The one
is, Have the British government acted with due diligence, or in
other words, in good faith and honesty, in the maintenance of the
neutrality they proclaimed?

The other is, Have the law officers of

the 'crown properly understood the foreign enlistment act?

Russell

went on to say:
"Neither of these questions could be put to a foreign
government with any regard to the dignity and charac
ter of the British Crown and the British nation. Her
Majesty’s government are the sole guardians of their
honor. They can not admit that they have acted with
bad faith in maintaining the neutrality they professed.
The law officers of the Crown must be held to be better
interpreters of a British statute than any foreign gov
ernment can be presumed to be. Her Majesty’s govern
ment must therefore decline either to make reparation
and compensation for the captures made by the Alabama
or to refer the question to a foreign state."
He added the conciliatory if rather ambiguous statement: "Her Majes
ty's government, however, are ready to consent to the appointment
of a commission, to which shall be referred all claims arising dur
ing the late civil war, which the two powers shall agree to refer
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to the commission."xc
The correspondence was at once published in the gazette. and
the Times in commenting editorially on it admitted the desirability
of a settlement, and construed the proposal of a commission as de
signed to embrace the Alabama claims.

On the day following this

editorial, there appeared an official correction in the Times, and
13
in which the correctness of this implication was denied.
Adams construed the note of Russell as declining the proposal
of arbitration, but thought that his government would be willing to
consent to the appointment of a joint commission to settle the
. .
14
claims.
Seward accepted Russell's statement as implying that the
Alabama claims were among those which the British government would
not be willing to refer to such a joint commission.

On this con

struction of the offer Seward declined it, but directed Adams to
inquire whether this interpretation of Russell's note was correct.
Assuming that it was, he authorized Adams to say that "what ever
may have heretofore been or might now have been thought by us of
umpirage between the two powers, no such proposition for arbitra
tion of the existing differences will henceforward be insisted upon
or submitted by this government."

^e added: "This government may

reasonably be expected to avail itself of the advantages, ix any,
1

r

which have resulted from a change of circumstances."
Russell cleared up any doubt about the meaning of his offer
when he wrote that the arbitration of the claims in the cases of
the Alabama and other vessels ?;ould be inconsistent with the stand
Her majesty's government had always taken in the matter.

me
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government would not be responsible for acts committed outside her
jurisdiction.16

Now Seward definitely declined the offer to create

a joint commission since the claims for the depredations of the
17
Alabama would not be referred by Great Britain.
Russell was replaced by Clarendon in the Foreign Office in
the autumn of 1865.

Diplomatic exchanges proceeded without bringing

the question nearer to a settlement.

Clarendon closed the corres

pondence with the observation:
"No armed vessel departed during the war from a British
port to cruise against the commerce of the United States;
.... the British government have steadily and honestly
discharged all the duties incumbent on them as a neutral
power, and have never deviated from the obligations im
posed upon them by international law.
The Fenian Movement which had for its object the establish
ment of an independent republic in Ireland added fuel to the hostil
ity against England.

The movement received enthusiastic support

from the Irish population in the United States who took advantage of
the widespread hostility to England to further their cause. Fenian
conventions were held and a general convention even went so far as
to elect a president for the Irish Republic.
Canada by the Fenians.

Raids were made into

The United States government under the lead

ership of President Johnson took action to quell these enterprises,
and received from the British government warmest acknowledgment of
their promptness and sincerity in suppressing these measures.

At

the same time many Irishmen, who had been naturalized in the United
States, returned to their native land to participate in the Fenian
movement there, and often times got themselves into trouble vith the
British government.

They were treated by the British government as

Br----------- ------------------------------------
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British subjects since the principle of expatriation was not recog
nized by that country.

Many Irishmen who had become American citi19
zens were imprisoned and tried for high crimes and misdemeanors.
The politicians in this country did not hesitate to take advan

tage of the situation to get votes for themselves and their party.
The Fenians felt aggrieved at the Government's attitude toward the
raids into Canada.

The Canadian and the British governments refuse d

to release the prisoners, and it seemed to the Fenians that the
American consuls were failing to maintain the rights of American
citizens.
liberal.

They felt, too, that the attitude of Adams was very il
The Radical opponents of the Johnson administration en

couraged this dissatisfaction and ingratiated themselves with the
Fenians.
Shortly before Congress adjourned in 1866, two resolutions wer B
passed under the leadership of the Radicals.

One requested the

President to "urge upon the Canadian authorities and also the Bri
tish Government the release of Fenian prisoners recently captured
in Canada."

The second urged Johnson "to cause the prosecutions

instituted in the United States courts (against the Fenians) to be
discontinued.
Rear the close of the same session, the Fenians wanted to rent
a public building in Washington to hold a meeting.
was denied them by the mayor of the city.

This privilege

A resolution was intro

duced by Wilson of Massachusetts from the Committee of Military
Affairs which would authorize the use of the building for the
Fenians.
lution.

Reverdy Johnson of Maryland alone spoke against the reso
He said the resolution would support people whose avowed

purpose was to make war against Great Britain.
our neutrality laws should be enforced.

He insisted that

He indicated the motives

of the supporters of the resolution when he said:
"Politicians who suppose or act as if they supposed
that mere party is patriotism, who think.... that tem
porary success is permanent fame, may lend themselves
to encourage lawless proceedings, and may be found pro
fessing friendship for and alluring on an impulsive^
class who, smarting under the injustice they honestly
believe has been done them and their ancestors in their
native land, are tempted to violate our laws or disre
gard our national duty in order to obtain voters at a
coming election."21
He thought that England would soon wake up to her default in pre
serving her neutrality and repair all the consequent damages.
Nye of Nevada replied that England had never shown any such
magnanimity towards the United States, but had been exercising a
defiant and impudent attitude.
the Irish struggle for freedom.

&e said he clearly sympathized with
He pointed out that the Fenians

were joining the ranks of the Republicans since they discovered
they had linked their political destinies on the wrong car.

Howe

of Wisconsin paid high compliments to the Irish character and pat
riotism.

"Freedom," he said, "must be as dear a thing in Ireland

as in America or elsewhere.... No man who loves equity and justice
and fair dealing can fail to sympathize with Ireland and those who
struggle for it."

Wilson of Massachusetts said he never had any

affection for England nor was ever awed by her splendor or charmed
by her power.

He said he felt the government had erred in enforcing

the neutrality laws in the movement in Canada.

Stewart of uevada

thought the time had come to take some action in Congress as expres
sive of the sentiment of the nation and show sympathy with the Irish

THlrheT'irh

rather than with Great Britain which had tr®ate^u^so^adly!!?^cEr
resolution was passed hy a vote of twenty yea; seven nay.
Robinson of Hew York made his appeal to the Irish vote by at
tempting to show that Adams had been lax in maintaining the rights
of American citizens abroad.

He went so far as to move impeachment

Prz
proceedings against Adams. °

In the cabinet, Stanton tried to enlist the Irish element
against the administration on the

Fenian question by having Seward

issue a proclamation which should have come from the 'tfar Department.
24
Stanton wanted to do nothing against the Fenians.
The deep sense of wrong in the minds of people in the United
States found further expression by resolutions introduced by Chand
ler of Michigan.

In December 1864 he introduced a resolution to
25
list the damages and demand that they be paid with interest.
He
said, "Ho nation was ever so well prepared to demand compensation
at the cannon's mouth as we....

I meant that these claims be paid

and promptly paid, paid in full, and if they were not paid, the
worse for the British government."2^

In 1866 he said, "Great Britain

has declined to pay such bills. She has decided that henceforth the
rule of war shall be the torch— that the torch is to be evidence of
neutrality.

If she desires that in all future time, whenever she be

at war, American citizens shall send forth fast sailing steamers
with the torch to illuminate the seas with British commerce, so be
it."27

He then presented a resolution to withdraw our minister from

London and issue a proclamation of non-intercourse,

-tie thought that

if the resolution passed, the bill would be paid in thirty days.
July 1866 he offered another resolution to repeal our neutrality

In
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laws beoause he thought they were a farce as they stand.

These

resolutions would have required unanimous consent to be considered.
Since they were objected to by Johnson and Sumner, they were tabled
and not heard of again in Congress.2®
In Hovember 1867, Chandler presented a resolution to "maintain
strict and impartial neutrality in the contest between Great Britain
and Abyssinia, granting to ....

each belligerent the same rights

and privileges upon land and water."29

He said he introduced this

to retaliate for the treatment Great Britain offered us during the
Civil War.

He made a list of claims when the resolution was pre-

sented and said that England must abandon the continent to satisfy
our wrongs.

He made clear that the resolution was no joke as some

in the Senate and the press seemed to think.
forth a brief debate.
suffered great wrongs.

This remark brought

Anthony of Rhode Island agreed that we had
He explained that our rapid growth had made

England jealous and that she wanted to destroy her competitor.

He

thought we should interpret the law as she had interpreted it.

Our

country, he said, should be developed and made attractive to capita.,
and labor by building up our factories.
ish England.
England.

This he thought would pun

Uye said that a little lesson would not be lost on

She had caused us much suffering,

He criticized Sumner

for not reporting resolutions on the matter from his committee.
Reverdy Johnson said he could see no good that could come out of
the resolution.

He said it w'ould involve us in a war with England.

He agreed that England was wrong, but he thought the claims should
be arbitrated.

Sumner said the resolution was premature, and sue-

ceeded in having it tabled.
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In IQS^^^^^ous^^y^Sepre^nfa^Tve^^manimouSTy pasfe
to modify our neutrality act of 1818.

The bill was reported by Ban s

“rom the Foreign delations Committee.

He said the object of the bil 1

was to soale the neutrality act of this country to the standard of
the Foreign Enlistment Act of Great Britain.

The bill proposed to

repeal the provision of our previous law which prohibited the fitting
out of ves els without the jurisdiction of the United States.

It

also proposed to repeal the section which prohibited the setting on
foot expeditions against a foreign power.
clearly made to favor Fenianism.

This latter provision wasi

^rth of Indiana supported Banks.

He said that the existing law placed restraint upon our citizens
which no other country placed on theirs.
ow the precedent she
avor of a new law.

Great Britain

He said also, "We but fol-

set us."
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Conkling was in

^e said that our painstaking foreign policy hacj.

never been reciprocated by other countries.

Hatterson of 11ew Hamp

shire and Raymond of Hew Y0rk thought that the act needed careful
consideration.

Raymond proposed a joint committee of the House and

he Senate to frame a new law, but his resolution was voted down.
Patterson thought that Banks’ proposition would put us at a disad
vantage in settling the controversy.
must be maintained,

Banks insisted that our right

^e asked Batterson what the people in the stat

he represented would say if he asked them whether it was time to de
fend the rights of this country against Great Britain,

-atterson,

who was of Irish descent and who had a large Irish constituency,
replied that he was deeply interested in ^rish liberty, but that
actions in which great interests of the country ’..ere involved re
4uire great consideration,

hanks said that he would rather go to

the hearts of the people and take counsel of their courage and love
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of country than to go to professional men for advice as to what
32
action to take.
When the bill came to the Senate, Wade asked that it be passed
by common consent.

Sumner moved that it be referred to the Commit

tee on Foreign Relations.

Stunner's motion prevailed and the bill

was never reported out from the committee.

On February 27, 1867

Sumner asked that the committee be discharged from further consid33
eration of it."
This was agreed to by the Senate. Sumner said
later that if attempts had been made to force passage of the bill,
he was willing to filibuster for five hours at least, and the remainder of the session if necessary.

Z&

Seward wrote to Adams: ’’There is not one member of this govern
ment, and, so f r as I know, not one citizen of the United States,
who expects that this country will waive in any case the demands
that we have heretofore made upon the British government for the re25
dress of wrongs committed in violation of international law.
Russell's refusal to discuss the question of liability for the
Alabama claims was regarded as a mistake by many public men in Engc
land who sincerely desired to remove all grievance and ill feeling.*' 6
It was perceived that the subject was one that involved more substai tial questions of law and international conduct which the governmenmight consider without abating anything of the dignity and charactei
of the crown. ^

Olyphant, a member of Parliament, who had traveled

in the United States and noted a feeling of resentment in this coun
+-VMT wrntfl nn article in the London Times in which he deplored the
rejection by Lord Russell of all attempts to settle these natural
38
difficulties by arbitration."
■

A change in the government brought a brighter outlook to those
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who wished to promote friendly feelings between the two countries,
lord Stanley was considered friendly to the United States, and Sir
Frederick Bruce was deeply impressed with the necessity of arriving
at a better understanding than had theretofore existed concerning
the claims of our citizens for indemnification for injuries sustained
during the war.
lord Derby in a speech in Parliament intimated that a proposi
tion for the arrangement of the differences in respect to the claims
would be favorably entertained by his government.

Magazine articles

began to appear in which it was confessed that the Palmerston govern
ment had not performed its duty in regard to the Alabama.

All

classes showed a growing disposition to reopen the question and
settle it as early as possible.4^
In August Seward sent to Adams a list of claims and directed
him to call the attention of lord Stanley to them in an earnest but
respectful manner.

He said that the president felt that it became

urgent that friendly relations be established between the two gov
ernments.

He again oharged that the premature and injurious pro

clamation of belligerency was the unfortunate cause of the present
unfriendly feeling.

He spoke of the "ruinous British warlike exped

itions against the United States" notwithstanding remonstrance. The
United States would, however, be willing to consider a comprehensiv e
settlement of any claims whether a boundary, commercial issue, or a
judicial regulation.41
In answer to Seward's statements, Stanley replied that the
state of war had been recognized by courts in this country; that
it was impossible for the present government of Great Britain to
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admit liability for the claims put forward; that they could not ac
knowledge that their predecessors had been wrong; but that they
would not be disinclined to adopt the principle of arbitration pro
vided that a fitting arbitrator could be found, and that an agree
ment could be reached as to the points to which arbitration should
apply.

He insisted, however, that the question of alleged premature

recognition of belligerency was one as to which ’’every state must
be held to be the sole judge of its duty,"42
To this proposal of lord Stanley, Seward replied that while he
did not object to the remedy of arbitration, he declined to accept
it with the limitations which lord Stanley proposed,

Seward insis

ted that the whole controversy should be submitted just as it was
found in the correspondence between the two governments without im
posing restrictions, conditions, or limitations on the umpire, and
Arz

without waiving any principle or argument on either side,
Stanley objected to this unlimited reference since it would
bring in wider issues which Her Majesty's government could not ar
bitrate,

He suggested two conventions to be set up separately and

simultaneously; one to consider claims arising out of the depreda
tions of the Alabama and similar vessels, the other to examine the
general claims of the citizens of both countries.

This limited

reference was tendered upon the condition that the United States
44
waive the position that the Queen's proclamation was not justified
Seward replied: "We can not give any preference to any other
claims over the Alabama claims.
one and the same tribunal."45

All claims must oe referred to
The United States can not, he said,

waive the position they had constantly maintained from the
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beginning:
"that the Queen's proclamation of 1861 which accorded
belligerent rights to insurgents against the authority
of the United States, was not justified on any grounds,
either of necessity or moral right, and therefore was
an act of wrongful intervention, a departure from the
obligation of existing treaties, and without sanction
of the law of nations."
AA

The proposed limited reference was therefore declined.
tiations then ceased for a year.

The nego

Progress had been made, for Great

Britain had changed her attitude from an unwillingness to discuss
the claims to an acceptance of a limited arbitration of them.
Seward wrote to Adams in January, 1868:
"Lord Stanley seems to have resolved that the so-called
Alabama claims shall be treated so exclusively as a pecun
iary commercial claim as to insist,on altogether exclud
ing the proceedings of her Majesty s government in regard
to the war from consideration in the arbitration which he
proposed.
On the other hand, I have been singularly unfortunate
in my correspondence if I have not given it to be clearly
understood that a violation of neutrality..... and kindred
proceedings.... [are^j regarded as a national wrong and
injury to the United States; and that the lowest form of
satisfaction for that national injury that the United
States could accept would be found in an indemnity, without reservation or compromise, by the British government."
Seward intimated further that other subjects were pending
which might at any time become a matter of controversy and "that
Her Majesty's government, if desirous to lay a broad foundation for
friendly and satisfactory relations, might possibly think it exped
ient to suggest a conference, in which all matters referred to might
be considered together and a comprehensive settlement attempted
without exciting the sensibilities" that were understood to have
caused that government to insist upon a limited arDitration in case
of the Alabama claims.

Adams was instructed to communicate these

directions informally but with distinct understanding that the
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United States are not proposing any new negotiations on the question
Seward suggested to Thornton, the British representative in
this country, that the naturalization question should be settled by
a treaty similar to that which the United States signed with the
North German states; that the San Juan boundary dispute be referred
to the president of Switzerland ; and that when all these things were
done, the existing irritation would be so far relieved that "we can
provide for adjusting the Alabama claims in a manner practically un
exceptionable to either country."4^
Beverdy Johnson was selected to succeed Adams on June, 1868.
Johnson did not retain the good opinion at home which his country
men had when he entered upon his mission.

He chapened his office

by an inordinate love of speech-making, and offended the patriotic
masses at home by his convivial and apparently sympathetic association with the bitterest English partisans of the late rebellion.
50
Bright said: "He means well, but has been indiscreet.

49

Johnson was instructed by Seward to settle difficulties regard
ing naturalization questions on the basis of the treaty with the
North German States; to attempt settlement of the Northwest boundar y
dispute; and if Great Britain seemed favorably disposed to settle
the first two questions, Johnson was to sound out Lord Stanley on
the subject of settling the claims upon the model of the commission
of 1853.

51

Johnson pursued his instructions with vigor, and by October
52
protocols were signed to cover the first two questions.
He then
inquired whether he might sign a protocol covering the Alabama
claims on the basis of the Treaty of 1858, with the King of Prussia

49

as arbitrator.^

Seward directed that Johnson was to insist that

the treaty be based on that of 1855 without naming any arbitrator
in advance since the Senate would be sure to object to any arbitra54
tor so named.* ' Seward instructed Johnson to make haste with the
55
claims protocol.
The Treaty of 1853 provided that all claims which had been pre
sented to either government since 1814 should be referred to two
commissioners, one appointed by the President and the other by the
Queen.

The commissioners were to meet at London.

Before making

any decisions, the commissioners were to name some third party to
act as arbitrator in any cases where the commissioners could not
agree.

If the commissioners could not agree on who the arbitrator

was to be, each was to name a person.

V/henever the commissioners

could not agree on a decision, one of the persons named as arbitra
tor was to be chosen by lot for that particular case.

The commis-

sioners were to consider all evidence which might be submitted by
their governments^-1^ to hear one person for each government who
would represent it as counsel.

The*re was to be no appeal from the
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decision of the arbitrator. u
On November 10, 1868, Johnson and Stanley had completed a con
vention for the settlement of all outstanding claims which had
arisen since 1853.

This convention provided for the submission of

all claims of British subjects against the United States, and of
all- claims of citizens of the United States against Ureat Britain,
to a tribunal of four commissioners, two to be appointed by each
government.

The tribunal was to sit in London.

The convention

also provided that the settlement of all claims except the Alabama
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claims should he determined by a majority vote.

In the case of the

Alabama claims a unanimous decision would be required.

If the com

mission should be unable to come to a unanimous vote, the claims
should be referred to the sovereign head of a friendly state who
should be chosen before any of the claims were considered by the
commissioners.

In respect to all other claims, if the commissioner

were unable to come to a decision, an arbitrator was to be chosen
by lot from two named by the commissioners, one being chosen by the
representatives of each country.

The convention further provided

that neither government should make out a case to support its posi
tion touching the Alabama claims.

Only the official correspondence

already exchanged on the subject was to be laid before the commissioners or the arbitrator.
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Seward was disappointed with the convention.
"sick, quite sick," he said.

It made him

"The whole thing was wrong, contrary

to instructions, must be sent b a c k . I n

the cabinet meeting

Seward did not make clear what his objections to the convention
were.

President Johnson was anxious about the trea.ty.

desired to accept and send in the treaty.
one was not in good shape.

He said he

He did not know why this

Welles said he thought that Seward had

not been disposed to hasten a decision, and that he wished to pro
long the negotiations.

Seward had requested that the English sub

mit to arbitration the question whether the British government had
59
acted with due diligence.
Two days later Seward read to the cabinet his instructions
which he proposed to send to Johnson.
to the convention.

The commission,

They contained his objection s
qoid

»

must sit in Washington »
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not London, due to the highly disturbed national sensibilities.

He

objected that the Alabama claims were discriminated against, in
that: first, they required the decision of the commissioners upon
any of those claims to be unanimous; second, in that they prescribed
a different mode for the choice of an umpire for the Alabama claims
from that provided in respect of all other claims; and third, that
in the case of the Alabama claims the choice of an arbitrator was
limited to the sovereign head of a friendly state while in the case
of other claims no such restriction was made,

objected also to

the provision which prohibited additional argument and evidence. He
thought that this limitation might excite distrust among the people
of both countries.
These instructions were not approved by the President nor any
member of the cabinet.

Welles and Evarts inquired whether claims

for captures, destruction of property, and prizes were to be per
mitted.

Seward avoided an explicit answer.

Evarts thought that if

such claims were permitted, the British claims against the United
States would be larger than the claims of the United States against
Great Britain.

The President favored postponing a final decision

in regard to the despatch, but Seward wanted an immediate decision.
After the cabinet meeting the President had a consultation with
Welles.

The President wished to have the subject disposed of dur

ing his Administration or to have the Senate responsible for the
delay.

Welles advised the President that since the subject was in

the hands of Seward, he would be dissatisfied if overruled by
others and his views set aside.

Welles thought it would be well

under the circumstances to let Seward try further negotiatio

with Reverdy Johnson.

Johnson followed this advice and directed

Seward to send the despatch.
Johnson was surprised to learn that the treaty was not satis
factory.

Before the changes recommended by Seward could be made

another change was made in the British government.

Stanley was re

placed in the Foreign Office by C l a r e ndon.Negotiations were im
mediately continued, and in a week's time Seward was able to tell
the cabinet that the claims of Englishmen for property destroyed in
the war and prizes condemned in our courts would not be included.
She cabinet was much relieved.64
Amendments were promptly made to the Stanley-Johnson conven
tion which, it was thought, would make the scheme acceptable in
this country.

On January 14, 1869 the new convention was signed.

It provided for the settlement of all claims arising since the
Treaty of 1853.

There was to be a board of four instead of two

commissioners as provided by the earlier convention.

The Alabama

claims were not expressly referred to, and the modes prescribed for
the choice of an arbitrator was uniform to all claims.

Arbitrators

were to be chosen by lot in each particular case where the commis
sioners were unable to agree.

The Johnson-Clarendon convention con

tained the further provision that if the commissioners, or any two
of them, should think it desirable that a sovereign of a friendly
state should be arbitrator in any claim, the commissioners should
report the fact to their respective governments, who within six
months would agree upon some such person to be invited to decide
upon the claim.

Before this arbitrator should be laid the official

correspondence which had taken place between the two governments,
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and any other written documents which were presented to the com
missioners in respect to the claim.65
Seward was delighted with the treaty.

he was especially

eager to bring to a satisfactory solution the complications which
arose while he occupied the State Department; but he soon realized
the difficulties in the way of ratification.

The administration

of President Johnson was unpopular and he was to be in a few months
replaced by Grant.

Seward wrote to Johnson, "Political adversaries

finding your negotiations crowned with complete success, will cavil
at the several treaties which you will have made, on the ground
that they fall short of what might and ought to have been secured."
"The confused light of an incoming administration was spreading
itself over the country, rendering the consideration of political
crt
subjects irksome, if not inconvenient."
It was felt by some tha1
68
the subject properly belonged to the new Administration.
Little
favor was shown towards the treaty in the cabinet.

Welles and

McCulloch were outspoken in their opposition, but the President
69
threw his support to Seward and submitted it to the Senate.
The convention was discussed in executive session and was re
jected by the vote of 54 to 1.
bate was Sumner* s speech.

The sensational feature of the de

Although delivered in executive session,

it was released for publication by authority of the Senate.

This

speech is of importance because of the relation it bears to subse
quent negotiations.^

It put obstacles well nigh insuperable in

the way of any future approach to an adjustment.
In Sumner's case against England, he held that country liable
on three grounds: first, in the concession of ocean belligerency;

secondly, in the negligence which allowed the evasion of the ships
in order to enter upon hostile expeditions against the United States;
and thirdly, in the open complicity with which she gave welcome to
Confederate cruisers in British ports,
claims which Seward had dropped,
individual losses at $>15,000,000.

he revived the national

■“■e estimated the direct damages or
"But this," he said, "leaves

without recognition the vaster damage to commerce driven from the
ocean, and that other damage, immense and infinite, caused by the
prolongation of the war, all of which may be called national in
contradistinction to individual."

The indirect damage to American

commerce was put by him at $>110,000,000, which he said was "only an
item in our bill."

he declared that the rebellion had been "Sup

pressed at a cost of more than four thousand million dollars," that
through British intervention the war was doubled in duration, and
that England was "justly responsible for the additional expendi
ture."

He added, "To my mind our first duty is to make England see

what she has done to us.

How the case shall be settled, whether by

money more or less, by territorial compensation, by apology, or by
an amendment of the law of nations, is still an open question; all
may be combined."7^
By the almost unanimous vote against the convention, taken
immediately after Sumner's speech, the Senate indorsed his views
and by releasing the speech for publication proclaimed them to the
world.

Adams said of that speech that its practical effect was to

raise the scale of demands of reparation so high that there was
little chance of negotiation left, unless the English had lost all
their spirit and character.72

John Bright said: "The rejection of
-
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the claims convention hy the Senate is a great misfortune, and
Charles Sumner's speech, so hostile and vindictive, has caused much
pain and disappointment."'^

The London press made the speech the

topic of hostile criticism, and public men in England were unanimous
in opposition to Sumner's views.
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In this country the speech met with hearty approval of the
Senate.
speech."

Anthony, who was in the chair, said, "That was a great
Other senators congratulated Sumner.
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Grant's views

conformed with those of Sumner, and after the speech Grant thanked
I
and congratulated Sumner. 7 6 Welles spoke of the'faanly vigor and
true statesmanship" which the speech displayed.
press applauded the speech loudly.^
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The Republican

Indeed, it would have been

too much to expect that a treaty submitted by the Johnson adminis
tration would be acted upon favorably by a Congress which had been
selected in November with great majorities for Grant.

The fault of

the treaty was that it offered absolutely nothing and might have
79
left matters in worse condition than they previously were.
Sumner
wrote to lieber: "I have made no demand, not a word of apology, not
a dollarl nor have I menaced, suggested, or thought of war.... My
object was simply to expose our wrongs as plainly but as gently as
possible.... To my mind our first duty is to make England to see
what she has done to us."88
Lord John Russell did not regret the action of the Senate in
rejecting the Johnson-Clarendon convention.
of the convention___ was....

that

He wrote: "The fault

it would have been open to the

United States to contend that the conduct of the British governmen
had been throughout wanting in good faith, and that an arbiter
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chosen by lot, perhaps Mr. Sumner, or a foreign power or State
should decide upon points deeply affecting the honor of the British
government.11
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Chapter III.
The Fish-Rose Convention

After the rejection of the Johnson-Clarendon convention by
the almost unanimous vote of the Senate, the Federal Government
took up the work anew under President Grant.

President Grant

was a military man, and, according to Sumner, he was known to
feel intensely on the Alabama question.

At the close of the war

he had expressed himself in a way hostile to Great Britain.
Sumner said of him:

"He (Grant) cared little whether England

paid our little bill or not;

upon the whole, he would rather she

would not, as that would leave the precedent of her conduct in
full force for us to follow, and he wished it understood that we
should follow it.”"*’ It was known that Grant had heartily approved
of Sumner's speech on the Johnson-Clarendon Treaty, and his views
carried great influence throughout the country.
Fish, the Secretary of State, being new in his position,
was inclined at first to defer as far as possible to Sumner.

Ee,

of course, looked to Grant as the head of the administration and
always gave him his steady loyalty.

Inexperienced in foreign

affairs as he was at first and inclined to be distrustful of him
self on questions of international law, the Secretary seemed to
O
have turned to Caleb Cushing most frequently for advice.
Sumner, by virtue of his long experience as chairman of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs, believed himself, of all the persons
connected with the administration the best informed on questions
of foreign relations.

His views, it was well known, were far
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his influence in the Senate and in the country was great.

What

he thought was certain to have an important hearing on the out
come of any negotiations.
Early in the administration discontent and dissatisfaction
were manifesting themselves among the leaders of the party.

Welles

observed that Sumner was wrathful and indignant at Grant's course
in making appointments.

Sumner complained among his friends that

he was offered nothing nor even consulted in regard to the Cabi
net, appointments abroad, or as to the policy which the adminis•55

tration should pursue. ' Indeed Sumner had not approved of Grant's
nomination as president, though he campaigned for him.

Sumner

early incurred Grant's disfavor when the latter wished to appoint
Washburne as Secretary of State as a compliment, and again later
when Grant wished to have the appointment of A. T. Stewart for
Secretary of Treasury confirmed.

Stewart was engaged in business

and his appointment would have been a violation of an early law
which orovided that "no person apoointed to any office instituted
by the act shall directly or indirectly be concerned in carrying
on the business of trade or commerce."
exempt Stewart from this provision.

Grant wished congress to

Sumner led the opposition

in the Senate to setting the law aside.

By increasing this ani

mosity Fish was later able to Influence Grant to support negotia
tions of a conciliatory nature with Great Britain.
Motley, a close friend of Sumner, was nominated as minister
to England.
twice.

Sumner had recommended Motley's appointment at least

Sumner's biographer

maintains

that

the

appoint-
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Partisans of

i?ish and Grant said that the appointment was made only on Sumner's
insistence, since Motley was scheduled to return to Vienna, where
he had served during the previous administration.0

The truth

doubtless lies between these two statements, and the appointment
was probably made as a concession to Sumner in order to maintain
harmony with the party.
The preparation of the instructions for Motley again brought
out the difficulty of reconciling Sumner's views with the general
policies of the administration.

When it became necessary to make

a statement in regard to the proclamation of belligerency, some
thing must be said which would not clash with the president's
desire to recognize the Cuban insurgents as belligerents.

On

the other hand the statement must contain nothing which might
impair Sumner's position that the recognition of the Southern
States as belligerents during the Civil War had converted a mere
rebellion into a prolonged war.
The Cuban insurrection had inspired considerable sympathy
in our contry especially in Hew York.

Appeals were made to the

government of the United States to aid the Cubans.

Those who

sympathized with the Cubans had enlisted the support of Bawlins,
the Secretary of War, who had great influence over Grant.

Rawlins

had early converted Grant to his views and the President desired
to aid the Cubans.

Such action would have been in direct conflict

with the attitude which the United States government had taken
with reference to the British proclamation of an earlier periou.
Sumner was consulted in preparing the instructions,

ae sug-
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[ gested that M o t l e y p r e p a r ^ ^ ^ s t ^ e ^ n t o ? ^ ? ^ ^ i e w ^ ^ o n c e r n i n ^
the controversy with England.

Motley’s statement was rejected by

Fish without any protest from Sumner.'''

Sumner also prepared a

memorandum which he proposed as the basis for Motley's instruction^.
In it he said that it was not advisable at present to attempt any
renewed negotiations.

He then stressed the wrong which the people

of Great Britain had committed by the proclamation of 1861.

The

sense of wrong he said had now been declared gravely, solemnly,
and without passion.

He said also that the sense of wrong was not

to be expunged by a mere money payment to reimburse our losses at
sea.

This statement hinted strongly at the annexation of Canada

as a method of reparation.

He said that the time would come when

Great Britain would see her fault, and be disposed to confess it,
and reparations of some sort would naturally follow.

Obviously

Sumner’s idea was to delay a settlement as long as possible.

Fish

now prepared his first draft of the instructions, in which he avoid
ed mentioning the proclamation of belligerency as a point in our
case against England.

Sumner stood strongly in his position against

the waiver of this point.

As soon as he learned of the substance

of this first draft he became highly excited and rushed to Ban
croft, Davis and exclaimed:
tration to sacrifice me —

"Is it the purpose of the adminis
me, a senator from Massachussets?"

Two days later he went to Fish, still highly excited and threaten
ed he would make Motley resign.
resign.

To this Fish replied, " Let him
Q
I will put a better man in his place."
This put Sumner

in a more reasonable frame of mind, and he prepared another state
ment of the case in which he was less positive and exacting in
his views, but this statement he withdrew as being inadequate.
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I Me wrote to Motley:
Tuesday.

"YourTns^ruuETons can not reacn you until

!

I have called in G. C. (Caleb Gushing), who has just

come from the secretary.

The first draft was fatal -- very. I

protested, and wrote a substitute,

last evening I dined at Fish's.

The next morning he again wrote to Motley:

i«9V

"I wrote a note

to Fish withdrawing my draft, and at the same time expressing my
dissent from the draft he proposed.

My purpose was to leave him

make his own statement, for which I should in no way be respon10
sible."
This note pointed to the coming conflict which would
ensue if the negotiations were not carried out according to the
views of the Chairman of Foreign Relations Committee.
What occured when Fish dined with Sumner is not in evidence,
but evidently the two disagreed.

When Fish received the note

which was referred to above, he wrote to the Senator:
"General Cushing called on me..... as I understood on your
suggestion.... I had determined to ask to introduce your
suggestions.... I am sorry to receive your note this morn
ing. I think that you are scarcely doing justice to me or to
the Administration. We have but one object, and differ only
as to some incidents, — they may be of more importance than
I suppose, or of less than you think, but can hardly be of
sufficient importance to break up an effort at negotiation
or to break down the Administration. I trust, therefore,
that you will reconsider the intimations of your letter."ll
That Sumner did reconsider is shown by the fact that when
Cushing drew up a compromise statement during a conference with
Fish, Sumner expressed his approval of them.

He then said that

he did not believe that our foreign policy would justify a more
vigorous statement at that time.
In preparing the instructions to Motley, Fish had three
objects in view.

First, he wished to show that the rejection of the

claims convention by the Senate was not an act of unfriendliness

66

Secondly, he wished to suggest a suspension of negotiations until
the prevailing irritation should subside.

Thirdly, he wished to

make clear that the government of the United States did not base
its claims on the British recognition of belligerent rights to
the Southern States.

Of these points the last was the most im

portant as well as the most troublesome.

This point vitally

affected the course of future negotiations, and also because it in
volved a sovereign right which it was the interest of all nations
to preserve.

Furthermore, the United States now wished to be in

a position to exercise that right in the insurrection prevailing
in Cuba.

It was this third point which would bring the administra

tion into conflict with those who, like Sumner, considered the
concession of belligerency a ground for claims against a govern
ment.
The views of Fish on the question of belligerency were ex
pressed in the instructions as follows:
"The President recognizes the right of every power, when a
civil conflict has arisen within another state, and has
attained a sufficient complexity, magnitude, and complete
ness, to define its own relations and those of its citizens
and subjects toward the parties to the conflict.... .
"The necessity and propriety of the original concession
of belligerency by Great Britain at the time it was made hav|
been contested and are not admitted... The President re
gards that concession as a part of the case only so far as
it shows the beginning and the animus of that course of con
duct which resulted so disastrously to the United States. It
is important in that it foreshadows subsequent events.
"There were other powers that were contemporaneous with
England in similar concession, but it was in England only
that the concession was supplemented by acts causing direct
damage to the United States. The President is careful to
make this discrimination, because he is anxious as much as
possible to simplify the case, and to bring into view these
subsequent acts, which are so important in determining the
question between the two countries."
In regard to the future course of the negotiations, Fish said:
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"This government, in rejecting the recent convention, aban
dons neither its own claims nor those of its cltizens, nor
the hope of an early, satisfactory, and friendly settlement
of the questions... The time and circumstances under which
the convention was negotiated were very unfavorable to its
acceptance either by the people or the Senate. The nation
had Just emerged from its periodical choice of a Chief Magis
trate, and having changed the depository of its confidence
.... looked with no favor on an attempt at settlement of the
great and grave questions depending by those on the eve of
retiring from power without consulting.... the views of the
ruler recently intrusted with their confidence....(The Sen
ate's) refusal can be no subject of complaint, and can give
no occasion for dissatisfaction or criticism...... A sus
pension of the discussion on these questions for a short
time... will allow the subsidence of any excitement or irri
tation growing out of the negotiation or of the rejection of
the treaty — will enable the two governments to approach
the more readily to a solution of their differences......
(The P r e s i d e n t ) h o p e s t h a t w h e n t h e q u e s t i o n s h a l l a g a i n
b e c o n s i d e r e d it m a y c o m p o r t w i t h the v i e w s of H e r M a j e s t y ' s
G o v e r n m e n t to e m b r a c e w i t h i n the s c o p e o f t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s
s ome a g r e e m e n t b y the t w o g o v e r n m e n t s , d e f i n i n g t h e i r r e 
s p e c t i v e r i g h t s a n d d u t i e s as n e u t r a l s . "14

In communicating these instructions to Lord Clarendon,
Motley very decidedly departed from their spirit.

His tone

showed that he was inclined to follow Sumner's reasoning on the
question.

He said that he was fully sensible of the gravity of

the questions involved and of the contingencies that would de
pend upon the negotiations concerning such burning questions as
those comprehended under the simple title of a convention for
the settlement of all outstanding claims.

These questions he

said hinged on great principles of law and involved the welfare
of nations and the contingencies of war and peace.
jected convention he said:

Of the re

"(It would have) covered up a griev

ance which most certainly would have continued to rankle and to
fester beneath the surface and (those wounds) must be probed
before they could be healed." In regard to the recognition of
belligerency, Motley said that the President recognized the right
of a sovereign power to issue proclamations of neutrality under
4
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I do that we are ready to let them go whenever they shall wish;
but they do not desire it."

Fish had even suggested to Thorn

ton that he ascertain whether Her Majesty's Government would
offer any objection to a free vote being taken in Canada to de
cide whether the people desire to join with the United States or
not.22
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claims

cabinet

on C a n a d a as

I would be willing

at o n c e . " 2 -^

Early in the summer, Sir John Rose, a member of the commission
which had been appointed to settle the claims of the Hudson's
Bay and Puget Sound companies against the United States arrived in
Washington.

He was in the confidence of Lord Clarendon and the

real object of his visit was to sound the government on the sub
ject of the Alabama claims.

Fish had already intimated that the

views as expressed by Sumner on the annexation of Canada were not
in a c c o r d

with his

an agreement.

own views

as to t h e b e s t m e a n s

of a r r i v i n g at

24

On the 26th of June, Cushing wrote to Rose saying that he
had seen Fish and had arranged for a meeting of the two. Cushing
'
wrote to Rose: "I am not sanguine of immediate conclusion of....
a treaty as either you or I might desire, but I think the time

. 71

has

arrived to

commence,

trusting that

discretion,

patience,

and

good-will on both sides may eventuate, in this important matter,
satisfactorily to the two governments."2®
On the 8th of July Rose met Pish and on the next day at dinner, the first interview took place.

Already Pish expressed a

willingness to depart from Sumner's demands.
assistant

s e cretary of

state,

made

this

Bancroft Davis, the

record

of the

interview:

"Mr. Fish said that the time had not arrived; that the
British people were too much irritated by the rejection
of the treaty, and by Mr. Sumner's speech, and that our
people were too much carried away with the idea of paying
off the cost of the war with the amount of damages that
Mr. Sumner’s speech had made out against Great Britain.
He said that when the excitement subsided, the appointment
as special envoy of man of high rank, authorized to express
some kind word of regret, would pave the way for a settle
ment; and he outlined to Sir Sohn the exact scheme for ,
settlement which was adopted a year and a half later."2®
Sumner's views at this same time were not so conciliatory.
On

July

19 h e

wrote

to

Cushing:

•
"There is a lull in our relations with England, which....
will continue until broken by Congress.... It seems best
that our case....with all details, should be stated to
England without any demand of any kind. England must know
our grievances before any demand can be presented. When
this is comprehended, a settlement will be easy."2?
Sumner visited
the

discussion with

ous

statement

done b e fore

tion

in t h a t b o d y ,

that

s uch

to

in A u g u s t ,

the B r i t i s h

of o u r c a se.

were

unfavorable

Fish

Congress
and

an o c c u r r e n c e

and

government by

Sumner thought
assembled,

there might

a peaceful

1869

there

renew

a fresh and v i g o r 

that unless
would be

something

dissatisfac-

s o m e t h i n g o c c u r w h i c h w o u l d be

settlement.

would be

advised h i m to

quite

Butler had hinted
l i k e l y . 2®

to h i m

In a l e t t e r to

.

Motley Sumner said:
"I..... advised (Pish) strongly to present our case before
the meeting of Congress.... Or there would be dissatisfac
tion. I think I made an impression on him, for he invited
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me to prepare such a paper. This I declined...... I am
pained at the attacks I fear (Fish) must encounter. A vig
orous presentment of our case will take from critics one of
their weapons.”29
In a private letter Fish again expressed his views on the
question of a settlement with Ungland.
wide divergence from those of Sumner.

These views again show the
Fish wrote:

"I should esteem it the greatest glory, and greatest happi
ness of my life, if it could be settled while I remain in
official position; and I should esteem it the greatest
benefit to my country to bring it to an early settlement....
I want to have the question settled, I would not if I could
impose any humiliating condition on Great Britain, I would
not be a party to anything that proposes to 'threaten her',
I believe that she is great enough to be just; and I trust
that she is wise enough to maintain her own greatness. • ho
greatness is inconsistent with some errors.... ^r. Bright
thinks she was drawn into errors— so do we. If she can be
brought to think so, it will not be necessary for her to say
so--at least not very loudly. It may be said by a defini
tion of what shall be Maritime International Lav/ in the
future, and a few kind words. She will want in the future
what wa have claimed. Thus she will be benefited— we satis
fied.”30
Sumner, in an address delivered before the Republican State
Convention, on September 22, 1869, restated his views on the re
cognition of belligerency, and went on to urge the cession of
Canada as compensation for our claims.

He said that the union of

Canada with the United States was an appointed destiny, but that
it must come about be peaceful means and with the consent of the
Canadian people.^1

In view of a later statement made by him,

this last point is very significant.
By the autumn of 1869 the waning fortunes of the Cuban in-'
surgents and the death of Rawlins, the chief supporter of the
Cubans, had pushed that issue into the background of the adminis
tration’s foreign policy.

It was now possible for the Secretary

of State to state Sumner's view on the question of belligerency
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which was also Grant's position.

Fish took Sumner’s advice of the

month before, and with the help of Gushing, he wrote in the in
structions of September 25, a vigorous statement of our case with
out any demand,

These instructions adopted more

of the views of

Sumner as the policy of the administration, even including the
’’indirect damages.”

Lord Clarendon remarked that it was Sumner's

speech all over again.3 • In these instructions Fish said:
’’The ^resident.is not yet prepared to pronounce on the
question of the indemnities which he thinks due from Great
Britain to the individual citizen of the United States for
the destruction of their property by rebel cruisers fitted
out in the ports of Great Britain. Bor is he now prepared
to speak of the reparation which he thinks due by the
British government for the larger accounts of national in
juries it has inflicted on, the United States. Bor does he
attempt now to measure the relative effects of the various
causes of injury; as, whether by the untimely recognition
of belligerency; by suffering the fitting out of rebel
cruisers; or by the supply of ships, arms, and munitions of
war to the Confederates.... ..All these subjects are for
future consideration. .........
"At the present stage of the controversy the sole ob
ject of the president is to state the position of the United
States in the various relations and aspects of this grave
controversy with Great 3ritain. It is the object of this
paper...... to state calmly and dispassionately....what
this government seriously considers the injuries it has
suffered.
It is not written as in the nature of a claim,
for the United States now make no demand against Her
Majesty's Government pn .account of the injuries they feel
they have sustained."00
Motley was instructed to read these instructions to Lord Clarendon
but not to leave a written copy unless it was particularly re
quested by him.
In the autumn of 1869 Rose was again heard from.

He said

that he had had conversations in more than one quarter in which
he conveyed his belief that a kindly word, or an expression of
regret, such as would not involve the acknowledgement of wrong,
was likely to be more potential than the most irrefragable
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reasoning on principles of international law.

Hose thought that

Motley had tried not to be too friendly so as to avoid the error
which Johnson had made.
tory as a representative.

He thought that Motley was unsatisfac
He wrote to Fish;

"If I am right in

my impression that you would prefer Washington and a new man,
and you think it worth while (for) me to repeat that suggestion
as one from myself in the proper quarter, a line from you......
34
will enable me to do so.”
After the British had received Fish's instructions of Septem
ber 25, Thornton was instructed to get an intimation of what
would be accepted by the United States government as a settlement
for the claims.

Both Fish and Thornton agreed that it would be

unwise to attempt any negotiations unless there was reasonable
assurance that an agreement was reached.

Fish was at the time

not prepared to give a definite statement since, as he wrote to
Sumner, he was not willing to do any thing until he had a chance
to learn what the Senate and the Committee for Foreign Affairs
would agree to.

Fish was anxious to know just what the Senate

and Sumner would accept, and he wrote to the Senator on November
16;

"Will you either note what you think will be sufficient to

meet the views of the Senate and of the country, or will you for
mulate such proposition?

Let me hear from you as soon as you can,

and I should like to confer with you at the earliest convenient
time."®6
During the summer of 1869 another situation was developing
which was to have important influence on the negotiations with
England.

Grant became interested in San Domingo and made the
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annexation of that island a policy of his administration.

Civil

war was being waged on the island, and the leaders of one of the
factions had enlisted Grant's support.

Grant sent Babcock, his

private secretary, to the island to inquire into the resources,
and the social and political conditions.
sent to the island.

Two warships were also

Backed by this show of force, Babcock signed

with authorized agents a protocol stipulating that for ^1.500,000
to pay the debt of the island, the agents would turn the country
over to the United States.

It was also stipulated in the proto

col that Grant would use his private influence in the United
States to secure the acceptance of the scheme in that country.
When the protocol was brought up in the cabinet, no member offered
to approve of it.

Fish wished to resign, but upon Grant's in

sistence he reconsidered, and reluctantly gave his support to the
enterprise with the understanding that Grant would give Fish a free
hand in other matters relating to the State Department, Babcock
was sent to the island again and negotiated two more treaties,
one for annexation and the other for the lease of the Bay of
Samana.

In order to get the treaties before the Senate, Grant

called at Sumner's home to discuss them. When the President left,
O
Sumner told him*. "Mr. President, I am an administration man and
what ever you do will always find in me the most careful and
candid consideration."^

Grant understood this statement as a

pledge of support while Sumner meant just what he said--that he
37
would give the treaties most careful and candid consideration*^
Fish did not intend to yield to Great Britain at all points.
Through his agreement with Grant in the San Domingo affair, dish
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was able to induce the President to make a statement in his

I

annual message in December 1869 which would allow the secretary to |
maintain the case against Great Britain on the basis of his first
instructions to motley.

The ^resident said that while the Govern

ment maintained it should be its own Judge when to accord the rights
of belligerency to the Guban insurgents, it did not believe that
they had yet developed a de_ facto political organization sufficient
to Justify a recognition of belligerency.

In this message Grant

also spoke of the indirect injuries which resulted from the course
pursued by Great Britain during the war.

Speaking of these in

juries in reference to the Johnson-Clarendon Convention he said:
"The convention treated them simply as such ordinary claims,
from which they differ more widely in their character than
in the magnitude of their amount, great even as it that
difference, hot a word was found in the treaty, and not an
inference could be drawn from it, to remove the &ense of
the unfriendliness of the course of Great Britain..."*38
He said he believed that the rejection of the convention by
the Senate was a step in the direction of a perfect and cordial
friendship between the two countries.
In January the San Domingo treaties were submitted to the
committee.

On March 15 the committee reported adversely, only

Morton and Marian being in favor of annexation.
the adverse report was due to Sumner's influence.

Grant suspected
He felt that

the Senator had been faithless, for Grant had understood him to
promise support to the treaty.

Sumner insisted that he had merely

promised to give the treaty his careful and candid consideration,
which he did.

Harlan, who favored annexation, later made a

statement in. the Senate, and which went uncontested^ that Sumner

-------------------- -----------------------------------------------u
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had withheld his opinions of the treaty when it was discussed in
the committee so that he might not unduly influence the judgment of
39
his associates.
Sumner felt all along that the treaty would
40
never receive the consent of the committee.
Such was the state
ment which he made to the press in 1871.
described

Grant's feelings were

by Forney in a letter to Sumner February 22 while the

treaty was still before the committee:

"She President had evi

dently determined to stand by the Republican Party and to strike
down the Republican statesmen.

The idea has got abroad here that
4GL
he has marked you out for sacrifice...”
When the treaty was discussed in executive session, Sumner
spoke against it.

Morton wrote in a private letter;

"In the progress of the discussion on the treaty Sumner
became much excited and talked freely against the manner
of its negotiation and bitterly assailed Babcock in a way
which could only reflect on the President. Charges of
fraud and corruption were sent from here (Washington) over
the country which the President believed emanated indirectly
from Sumner."
Finally Fish became assured that the treaty could not pass
the Senate.

A private count of the likely vote showed that the

requisite two-thirds could not be obtained in favor of it.

Fish

urged Sumner, who, as chairman of the committee, could control
the situation, to bring the matter to a vote and have it disposed
43
of. This Sumner refused to do.
Fish hinted at Sumner's appointment as minister to England
in Motley's place if he would change his attitude.

Grant, it was

known had such a scheme in mind to get rid of Sumner in the Sen
ate, but he declared he would make the appointment only with the
understanding that the Senator should be removed from his new
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office as soon as his name should be confirmed. “
were not successful.
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Such schemes

The vote was taken in the Senate on June 30,

and the treaty was rejected by a vote of 28 to 28, two-thirds
being necessary to ratify.
The breach between Grant and Sumner was now definitely mark
ed.

Motley, who was considered unsatisfactory as a minister in

London, was asked to resign the day following the rejection of the
treaty.

All but the routine duties had been taken from him as a

result of his departure from instructions in the summer of 1869.
how that the administration rupture had occurred, there was no
longer any need to allow Motley to remain at his post.

However,

Motley refused to resign, and was recalled later in the year.
The material results of this incident as it is related to
the controversy with Great Britain are that it gave Fish an oppor
tunity to carry his Cuban policy through and keep his position on
the belligerency proclamation uncompromised.

Furthermore, it

assured him of the President's support in putting through a set
tlement with Great Britain over any difficulties which Sumner
might raise.

President Grant, he was sure, would favor anything

which Sumner might now oppose.
Fish was steadily increasing in his influence over the Presi
dent.

During the summer of 1870 the Cuban affair again came up

to perplex the administration.

Lobbyists Were active in 'Washing

ton and promises of Cuban recognition were secured.

Cuban bonds,

the value of which was contingent upon the action of this govern
ment, were distributed.

Pressure was brought to bear on tiie

House Committee on Foreign Relations whose chairman was Banks. It

7lf

was well Known that t m s committeesffE'l!f??id to t6.Se
to the Cuban Independence.

Fish had made every effort during the

preceding months to set the administration right on this question.
He had prepared a message for Grant, but the latter had refused to
let it go out.

When action by the House seemed imminent, he pre

pared another report on the subject which was the basis of the pres:,
dent's message to Congress.

With the aid of Hoar, Cox, and Robeson,

President Grant was induced to approve it but with great hesita
tion and with much r e l u c t a n c e T h e message was issued just the
day before the committee was to report.

In this message the Presi

dent was made to repeat what he said about Cuban belligerency in
December 1869-

He then exposed the plot of the Cubans, pointing

out that they were speculating on their ability to involve the
United States in the contest.

He made clear what dangers were involved in supporting such a revolution. 46
Banks introduced the majority resolution which favored re
cognizing the insurgents.

Orth of Indiana introduced a minority

report opposing such action.

In the debate which followed the

President and the Secretary of State were severely criticized for
influencing legislation.

Fish particularly was made the object of

abuse, but he won a complete victory for his policy.

The minority

resolutions were adopted by the House in an amended form so that
they were a mere authorization to protest against the barbarous
conduct of hostilities.

In the Senate, Sumner opposed the admin

istration and spoke of the "unnatural jurisdiction in the New
World" and spoke of similar aspirations for independence in the
colonies of Great Britain.

The resolutions were not brought to

so

a vote in tin Senate.47 Sumner's influence was thus much lessened
and Fish was vindicated in his stand in the Cuban question.
Foreign affairs in Europe during 1870 were far from reassur
ing for Gre- t Britain.

The international situation was becoming

complicated and the future was uncertain.

The influence of the

Franco-Prussian War upon the progress for settlement was indicated
by a response of Thornton when Fish had once more mentioned Can
adian independence as a condition.

Thornton said; "Europe may at

any moment be convulsed; and if England became involved, it would
be impossible to prevent retaliation, and the ocean would swarm
with Alabamas.

England would then be compelled to declare war."

48

Fish replied that commerce destroyers would be fitted out in
American ports by England's enemies in spite of anything the Gov
ernment could do to prevent it.

Notwithstanding this gloomy out

look, the British government showed no signs of relinquishing
Canada.
During the summer of 1870 the idea of Canadian annexation was
losing popularity in the United States due to the decline of Sum
ner's influence, since he had been the principal champion of the
policy.

He had discredited himself with the administration by

blocking all expansionist plans while pushing his own favorite
project.

Grant, in spite of his hostility to Sumner, still clung

to the policy of exacting Canada as a condition for settlement.
In September he prevailed upon Fish to mention the policy once
more to Thornton.

By this time the Franco-Prussian War had passed

the stage where England was likely to become involved in it.
Thornton now replied to Fish; "It is impossible to connect due
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question of Canadian independence with the Alabama claims."49
By October the international situation had taken a new turn
once more.

Russia had taken advantage of the general disturbances

in Europe to renounce a provision of the Treaty of 1856 which had
been forced upon her and which excluded warships from the Black
Sea.

England denied the right of Russia to repudiate the treaty

and a menace of war existed for a month or more.
In view of these international complications, Lord Granville's
point was well taken, when, later, he was defending the settlement
with the United States before the house of Lords.

He said that it

was necessary to look at international relations of Great Britain
from a new standpoint, and added that it was impossible to say
that the British relations with the United States were on a satis
factory footing.50
During November when the tension in European affairs was high
est, the Russian minister in Washington suggested to Fish that the
time was most opportune to press the Alabama claims.
ready come to the same decision.
his policy.

Fish had al

He had, however, made changes in

He realized the futility of further negotiations on

the basis of Canadian independence.

While he knew that a settle

ment on any other basis would be opposed by Sumner, Fish decided to
deoena upon the President's animosity towards the Senator to assure
the necessary support.
On November 20, 1870, Fish had an interview with Thornton
in which he alluded to the suggestion of the Russian minister.
Thornton then asked what the United States wanted.

Eish replied

that this government asked merely an expression oi regret on the
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part of Great Britain, an acceptable declaration of principles of
51
international law, and payment of claims.
'fixis was a great con
cession on the part of Fish, and he proposed to have the negotia
tions on his terms.

The time was propitious, and the President's

message to Congress made recommendations which might prove em
barrassing to Great Britain.
The -^resident and his adviser had evidently decided that the
government would not allow the pressing need of private claimants
to operate in any degree upon public opinion in the United States
so as to create a demand for settlement with England on any basis
52
below that which the national dignity required.
He said in the
message:
"I regret to say that no conclusion has been reached for
the adjustment of the claims against Great Britain grow
ing out of the course adopted by that Government during the
rebellion. The cabinet of London, so far as its views have
been expressed, does not appear to be willing to concede
that Her Majesty's Government was guilty of any negligence
or did or permitted any act by which the United States has
just cause of complaint. Our firm and unalterable convic
tions are directly the reverse. I therefore recommend to
Congress to authorize the appointment of a commission to
take proof of the amount and ownership of these several
claims, on notice to the representative of Her Majesty at
Washington, and that the authority be given for the settle
ment of these claims by the United States, so that the Gov
ernment shall have ownership of the private claims as well
as the responsible control of all the demands against Great
Britain. It cannot be necessary to add that whenever Her
Majesty's Government shall entertain a desire for a full and
friendly adjustment of these claims the United States will
enter upon their consideration with an earnest desire for a
conclusioggconsistent with the honor and dignity of both
nations."
This veiled threat occasioned indignation in Great Britain
and the London Times declared his tone menacing.

It asserted that

Grant's tone held out no hope for a friendly settlement.

It was
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thought in some quarters that the words were designed for political
3ffect at home, but the message came at the psychological moment
to induce Great Britain to act.

It was realized in that country

that the.Grant administration had no desire to push the settlement
o f the Alabama question.

Grant wrote to Badeau:

"It is not half

so important that the Alabama Claims should be settled as it is
that when they are settled it sliould be in terms creditable to
this nation.

I do not see that any harm is to arise from the mat

ter standing in an unsettled state.
During the latter part of 1870 the administration attempted
to distract attention from domestic affairs by turning to foreign
affairs.

Ben Butler demanded that the government take a bold

stand with Great Britain.

He demanded that a portion of Canada

be ceded in settlement of the Alabama claims.^5
In December 1870 the breach between Grant and Sumner became
wider.

Attempts were made by leaders of the administration to

bring about a reconciliation between the two.

The President

manifested a good desl of hard feeling and refused to be pursuaded
that their differences could be reconciled.

Grant charged that

Sumner had attacked him in executive session of the Senate and
that Sumner had attributed dishonest motives to him.

Sumner de

nied all these charges publicly, and said that the president
had threatened to take him personally to account. ^
The renewal of the San Domingo controversy gave Sumner an
opportunity to arouse the administration still further against
him.

The President had requested in his message that a joint

resolution be introduced to bring about the annexation of the is
land.

During the summer Grant had strengthened his hold on those
8440^
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who had supported him,

and at the same time! had manifested an

intense personal bitterness toward Sumner, vrhom he held chiefly
responsible for the failure of the treaty.

Sumner had conceived

a cordial contempt for Grant which was a matter of general know
ledge.

HVhen the San Domingo question was again brought forward,

a clash of greater proportions than before was expected, and duly
57
came.
A Joint resolution for annexation was further than even
the most ardent supporters of the President were willing to go.
Instead a resolution was introduced to appoint a commission to
investigate conditions on the island.

Morton, who sponsored this

resolution, assured Sumner that this was only a wqy of dropping
the matter in a manner which would not be discourteous to the
President.

Sumner was not convinced that this was so, and in

stead of letting the matter pass without remark and so close the
issue, he opened the debate by saying, "The resolution before
the Senate commits Congress to a dance of blood."

In a violent

speech he uttered most offensive imputations against the President
and his advisers.

He said the president had usurped the powers

of Congress, and had committed an act of war without its consent.
He Intimated that Grant was following the footsteps of Pierce,
Buchanan, and Johnson.

He compared the murderer president Saget

of San Domingo in a favorable light with Grant.
whole scheme the purchase of a bloody lawsuit.

He called the
He went on to

charge that attempts had been made to change the membership of
the Committee for Foreign Affairs when it was felt that the
scheme would not pass.^®

Morton made a dignified reply.

fended the President and the administration.

He de

He accused Sumner

of taking this opportunity to attack the President.

Morton main-
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tained that the treaty was dead and the need for discussing*it
did not exist.

Chandler made personal attacks on Sumner.

Chandler

demanded he name the persons who had divulged the secrets of the
caucus to which Sumner had referred.
with party discipline.

Conkling threatened Sumner

He said:

"The Committee on Foreign Relations should not be composed
of* those who have added insult to injury, and arrayed them
selves not only in opposition to the Administration, but
so arrayed themselves in manner and substance as to make it
impossible for the Administration to confer with all the
committees of this body."59
The resolution passed the Senate by a vote of 32 to 9, 30 members
being absent from the chamber.

The bill was sent to the House

where it was passed only after an amendment was added which dis
tinctly provided that the appointment of the commission should
not in any way commit the administration to annexation.^0
The speech of Sumner on this occasion was not approved by
Sumner's friends.

It had diverted the attention from the issue of

annexation to that of the personal animosity between the Senator
and the President.

The people of the country still strongly sym

pathized with Grant and it was Impossible for the oratory of Sum61
ner to swing their sympathies from the military hero.
On January 9, 28*71 Rose was again at Washington.

Ostensibly

he came on private business, but in reality he had authority to
open informal negotiations for an immediate settlement.

Granville,

who was then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, wrote to
Bright:
"I have sent Sir John Rose to New York and Washington to
do that which is difficult for Thornton without committing
us. .....He is to ascertain from the Government and from
the opposition what chance there is of our simultaneously
agreeing to some beginning of a negotiation, if it were
only to assent to a joint commission, who, without being
commissioned to settle anything, migh", arrange in what

-

manner each Question in discussion might be best considered . " 6 2
On the evening when Rose arrived at Washington, he dined with
Fish and Bancroft Davis.
which took place.

Davis kept an account of the interview

Rose stated that he had baen requested by the

British government to ascertain what could be done for settling
the pending questions between the two governments.

He said he

was authorized to say that the British government would be willing
to refer the subject to a joint commission, Lf such a plan would
be acceptable to the United States.

Fish replied that before

agreeing to go into such a commission, there should be certainty
of success.

He asked whether the British government would be pre

pared to admit a liability for what were known as the Alabama
claims.

Rose replied that such a concession would not be made.

He said that while he thought that the British government would
be found liable for the damages committed by the Alabama, the
cases of the other vessels would be doubtful.

He said the British

government was willing to submit to arbitration either to contin
ental jurists, or to any other tribunal that the two governments
might agree upon. He added that Parliament would not support any
government which would admit the liability for the acts of the
Alabama.

Fish replied that the Senate would not ratify a treaty

which did not recognize that liability.

Most of the Senators had

opposed the Johnson-Clarendon Convention, and the changes in the
personnel

of the Senate due to the recent elections would not be

enough to secure the ratification of a new treaty on the same
basis.

Rose urged that if a commission once met, they would not

part without coming to some settlement.

Fish insisted that the

admission of liability as to the Alabama was necessary.

He said

he^ did not ask England to humiliate herself, but that she should

'
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feel that, due to the neglect of a local offlcer7'^hl^ ^ « ^ ^ l Sihadl |
been allowed to escape and the government sc became liable.

This

admission with an expression of regret for what had taken place
to disturb the relations of the two countries would be sufficient
as a preliminary.

Rose said that England could not take the ini

tiative in the question of the Alabama claims.

He suggested that,

if the way for settlement seemed clear, the British government
should propose a commission for the settlement of the San Juan
boundary, the fisheries, and other Canadian questions.

The United

States could then accede to the proposal provided that the claims
for the acts of the vessels should be also considered.^
After this interview Sir John Rose prepared a paper in which
he made certain observations and recommendations which became
the basis for the negotiations.

First, the commissioners should

provide protocols or treaties by means of which a full and final
adjustment might take place.

Second, the preamble should express

the desire of Her Majesty to put an end to all differences and to
lay the foundation of lasting bonds of amity between the two
countries.

Third, the sending of High Commissioners to Washington

would be accepted as a friendly advance, and the terms made
through such a body would be more likely to be acceptable than
any

arranged through ordinary diplomatic channels.

The commis

sioners should not decide questions themselves, but merely arrange
the machinery of doing so.

Fourth, the commissioners would be

subject to daily instruction from their governments, and mutual
concessions could be made as the need arose.

Fifth, it would be

desirable to have the opinion of the Senate before it adjourned,
so it was highly desirable to begin the negotiations immediately.^
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'added tbs' *.t "ore proceeding furpher with the 'negoti; tion it would be advisable to lay the memorandum of Rose directly
before Sumner and obtain either an approval of the new basis of
negotiations or an outright statement of his objections.

Friendly

;relations between the Senator and the Secretary had been broken
by -further developments in the Motley affair.

When Motley had

.

been asked to resign, he refused.

When, in November 1870, Fish

decided to drop all mention of Canadian independence from the ne
gotiations, he was preparing to discount all objections which
Sumner might raise and depend upon the President's animosity towards the Senator to insure support for his negotiations.
recall of Motley marked another step in that decision.

The

When Mot

ley attempted to defend himself and Sumner, Fish was prompted to
cover up any responsibility of the President, and the motives of
'
the case. He wrote a lengthy despatch to the legation in which
he disclaimed that there was any connection between Motley's re
moval and the San Domingo controversy.

He gave as the reason

that Motley was misrepresenting the administration's policy. With
out saying so, he implied that Motley represented Sumner rather
than the

President.

Fish concluded with a thinly veiled accusa

tion against Sumner of dishonesty towards the President in con65
nection with the San Domingo Affair.
Undoubtedly the San
Domingo controversy hastened the recall of Motley, but Cox report
ed that Grant said, "I had made up my mind to remove Motley before
there was any quarrel with Sumner."
Badeau:

Grant had also written to

"Mr. Motley's removal was long in contemplation,.... and

he was only left in England as long as he was out of deference to
Governor Fish, who is averse to changes, or to doing anything
which gives inconvenience to others."

Fish's action in the re-

moval of Motley and In writing the accusation to the legation
marks definitely his decision to remain loys.l to the Administration
at the expense of a rupture with his life-lcng friend, Sumner.
While he took the step reluctantly, he must have realized that
his ambition to effect a settlement with England could not be ac
complished while Sumner remained at the head of the Committee on
Foreign Relations.

Whether he so intended or not, the veiled in-

-

suit in his despatch paved the way for his removal from that posi
tion.
Since the Secretary and Sumner were no longer on speaking
terms, a friend arranged for an interview on January 15*

Two days

later Sumner sent this message to Fish:
"(1) The idea of Sir John Rose is that all questions and
sources of irritation between England and the United States
should be removed absolutely and forever.... Nothing could
be better than this initial idea. It should be the start
ing point.
"(2) The greatest trouble, if not peril, being a con
stant source of anxiety and disturbance is from Fenianism,
which is excited by the proximity of the Eritish flag in
Canada. Therefore, the withdrawal of the British flag
cannot be abandoned..... " °°
l
This was an ultimatum.

Sumner must have realized that such

a demand, would have broken off the negotiations.

It is difficult

to reconcile that demand with a previous statement of Sumner when
he said that annexation should come only by peaceful means and
69
with the consent of the population.
It was well known in Jan
uary 1871 that England would not give up Canada, and that the
population had no desire for annexation with the United States.
Fish spent a week consulting Senators of both parties and
received assurances of support in his efforts to bring about ami
cable settlement.7°

With this assurance he continued the negotia

tions along the lines already begun.
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On January 24 Fish again had an interview with Rose at which
time he read his answer to Rose.

To show how great a concession

he was about to make, Fish showed Sumner’s message to Rose.

Fish

then stated that it had been decided by this government that the
best interests of both countries demanded that, should England
agree to send out commissioners on the basis which had previously
been indicated, no effort would be spared to secure a favorable
result even if it involved a conflict with the Chairman of the
71
Committee of Foreign Relations of the Senate.
The accord reached after twenty months of secret diplomacy
was expressed in regular diplomatic form in four notes which passed between Fish and Thornton.
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On February 8, 1871 at the opening of Parliament the Queen
said in her speech, "I have suggested the appointment of a Joint
commission and I have agreed to a proposal of the President that
this commission shall be authorized at the same time and in the
same manner to resume the consideration of the American claims
growing out of the circumstances of the late war .'"'D
The instructions to the commissioners directed them to dis
cuss in a friendly spirit the various questions on which differ
ences had arisen.

The further purpose of the commission was to

decide on a method for the settlement of the questions. The ar
rangement was to include all claims for compensation which may
74
be agreed upon by the two governments.
Commissioners were promptly appointed by both countries.
The commissioners who acted on the behalf of the United States
were Secretary Fish, General Schenck, who had been appointed to
succeed Motley, Justice Nelson of the Supreme Court, Judge Hoar,
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and ex-Senator Williams of Oregon.

The British commissioners

were Earl de Grey and Rlpon, Sir Stafford Henry Northcote, Sir
Edward Thornton, minister to the United States, Sir John Mac
donald, premier of Canada, and Montague Bernard, Professor of
International Law at Oxford.

They met in Washington on February

27 and continued their sessions for six weeks.

At the first

meeting it was decided to keep secret the discussions and com
municate only with their governments.
It was now made to appear that no settlement with England
would be possible with Sumner at the head of the Committee on
Foreign Affairs.

Newspapers were circulating a rumor that the

British Foreign Office had informed our minister that there could
be no settlement of our differences with England as long as Sumner remained chairman of the committee. The same opinion was
voiced in Parliament. 75 Fish was able to use the animosity of
Grant toward Sumner to make the success of his treaty certain,
and the Senator's statements in regard to the withdrawal of the
British

flag from the continent were used against him, even

though the idea had earlier been as much Grant's as it was Sum
ner's.

When Congress met in March, 1871, it took steps necessary

to further decrease Sumner's influence.

When the list of com-

.

mittee members was presented, Sumner's name lid not appear on the
Committee on foreign Relations.

Howe of Wisconsin said:

"The

personal relations existing between Sumner and the President

and

the Secretary of State are such as preclude all social inter
course between them."

jje sai£ it was deemed best that the head

of that committee be on speaking terms with those officers in
order to discharge his duties.

Schurz denied that Sumner refused

President.

He reported that Sumner had agreed to receive Fish as

an old friend, and would be willing and glad to discuss such ques
tions as came up for consideration.

Wilson of Massachusetts said

the reason was insufficient, for Sumner's ability was needed in
the position.

He felt there was no need to have social inter

course in order

to transact business.

Edmunds declared thst the.

question was whether the Senate and the Republican party were
ready to sacrifice their sense of duty to the whims of one single
man.

To him the transaction was merely a business affair of

changing a member from one committee to another to suit the conven
ience of the Senate.

Steward said the President had a right to

expect respect in the committees, and he thought that business
could be better transacted if the change were made.

Schurz blamed

the President for the action of the caucus, and criticized him
for using pressure on the senators to make the change.

Morton,

the party leader, insisted that the vote of the caucus be abided
by and charged that it was the duty of every republican to sup
port i t . ^

The Administration could take no chances of having

the negotiations on the treaty fail, since the successes had not
been as great as might have been expected.
Even though Sumner was removed from the committee, the com
missioners were anxious in regard to the attitude he would take.
They paid him a good deal of attention.

Northcote wrote:

"We remain here.... because they (the government) think
we may be able to influence particular senators, such as
the Democrats and still more Sumner, over whom they have
no party control. I had a long talk with Sumner yester
day.... he is very cautious, but I do not think him un
friendly. He is very anxious to stand well with England;
but, on the other hand, he would dearly like to have a
slap at Grant. We have paid him a great deal of atten
tion since he has been deposed, and I think he is much

93

pleased at being still recognized as a power. He certainly
is one, for, though I think the Government could beat him
in the Senate, he could stir up a great deal of bad feel
ing in the country.
Sumner's position was described by Henry Adams, as follows:
"If he resists and fails, he is done for.
ceeds, he will break himself down here.

If he resists and suc
If he accedes and votes

for the treaty, Grant drags him in triumph at his chariot wheels.
That the treaty had a deep political significance is shown
by a letter from Sickles to Chandler in which he said:

"if Grant

settles the English question satisfactorily, it will save his
foreign policy, and if he wipes out the Ku Klux his record, in
cluding the excellent treasury exhibit, will carry him through
safely."80
Sir Stafford Northcote observed that the re-election of Grant
appeared to depend much upon the successful conduct of the Com
mission on the part of the Americans.

He said that the American

government wanted as great a triumph as possible and as conspic
uous a defeat of England as would be possible without the dis8X
turbance and discomfort of actual hostilities.
On May 10 the treaty was sent to the Senate and at once re
ferred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

When it was report

ed out, Sumner made the principal speech in which he discussed
fully the respects in which this treaty met the objections which
had been raised to the rejected Johnson-Clarendon Convention.
moved some amendments, but did not press them.

He

On May 24 the treal

was ratified by the Senate by a vote of fifty to twelve, Sumner
voting with the majority.

The twelve who opposed the treaty were

10 Democrats and 2 Republicans, which bears out the fact that the
treaty was accepted as a party measure.
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Chapter IV.
EXPRESSION OP PUBLIC OPINION
The available evidence

supports the conclusion that the

Senate regarded the Treaty of 7/ashington with favor*

amendments

were made in executive session to change some articles and to aau
others, but each proposal was rejected by a decisive vote*

Vickers

proposed an amendment which would allow the building of ships of
war and manufacturing munitions for the purpose of selling them to
belligerents*

The amendment would also have permittee the right

to asylum and hospitality to armed belligerent vessels which en
tered ports*

Such a proposal would have destroyed any value which

the treaty possessed as a means of preserving peace*

The proposal

was rejectee without calling for the yeas and nays, which shows an
earnest desire on the j^art of the Senate as a whole to establish
cordial relations with Great Britain*

Sumner proposed a series of

amendments to bring about certain results he deemed important*
First, he desired the security of private property at sea, not in
cluding contraband of war, and, second, the abolition of commercial
blockades.

He next asked for the denial of a national or belliger

ent character to vessels not holding a commission given at a port
in the actual occupation of the commissioning government, ana the
treatment as pirates of vessels employed in burning prizes at sea*
lastly he contended for the use of a more definite term than 'due
diligence' in the statement of the duty of neutral powers to pre
vent the fitting out of ships in their ports to aid a belligerent*
These amendments were all rejected as the Senate thought that it
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would not be prudent to open negotiations anew, and the treaty was
ratified without change*^
When the Queen's speech was delivered to Parliament on Feb
ruary 9, 1671, it announced the appointment of the joint commission
to devise a method of settling existing differences between the
United States and Great Britain,

The general opinion in both

houses was decidedly in favor of some form of settlement*

lisraeli

pointed out the complicated state of affairs in Europe and said
that there were .possible dangers which had arisen by the FrancoPrussian War*

The balance of power on the continent had been des

troyed, and it was realized that friendly relations with the United
States would help to create a new balane

of power.

While Lisraeli

favored immediate settlement with the United States, he thought
that a hostile attitude was assumed by that government when it ad
dressed Russia or Prussia.

He thought the President's message was

neither friendly nor respectful.

He then referred to what he called

an electioneering game in America in which animosity toward England
was stirred up to attract the Irish vote*

He thought that the

"rowdy rhetoric which is addressed to irresponsible millions" which
was used to excite poxitical passions by abusing England would
cease if England would maintain a more adequate army ana navy. 2
The successful conclusion of the negotiations brought a sen
sation of relief in England as well as in the United States. Moran
wrote that there was a wide spread feeling that the treaty would be
a measure to close all sources of dispute between the two countries
He added that there would be some opposition to the treaty on the
part of lord Russell, but that his opposition would be on personal

ICO

grounds rather than on a matter of principle.

Moran added that

nothing Russell could say would prevent the acceptance of the
3
treaty in England*1
The treaty consisted of forty-three articles, the first
eleven of which dealt with the settlement of the Alabama claims.
It provided that the claims be referred to a tribunal of five ar
bitrators who were to meet in Genev- *

Each of the parties was to

prepare its case and other evidence, and four months later each
party was to present a counter case and any additional evidence.
In deciding the matters submitted to the arbitrators, they
were to be governed by three rules which had been agreed upon by
the joint high commissioners:
"A neutral Government is bound-"First, to use due diligence to prevent the fitting out,
arming, or equipping, within its jurisdiction, of any vessel
which it has reasonable ground to believe is intended to.....
carry on war against a Power with which it is at peace; and
also to use lire diligence to prevent the departure from its
jurisdiction of any vessel intended to cruise or carry on war
as above.......
"Secondly, not to permit or suffer either belligerent to
make use of its port© or waters as the base of naval opera
tions against the other.........
"Thirdly, to exercise due diligence in its own ports and
waters....... to prevent any violation of the foregoing obli
gations and duties."4
A very important part of the treaty was Artisle i, in which
Great Britain e/pressea "in friendly spirit, the regret felt by
Her Majesty's Government for the escape, under whatever circum
stances, of the Alabama and other vessels from British ports, and
for the depredations committed by those vessels.
On June ll, 1871 Russell in the House of lords moved tnat
the treaty be not sanctioned*
cidedly since 1665.

He haa changed his opinion very de

In 1871 he said that he had no objections to
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offer to the appointment of arbitrators, or even to asking the ar
bitrators whether he was justified in not detaining the Alabama
while he had waited for a decision from the law officers*

Hie

greatest objection was to the three rules which he regarded as an
ex post facto law.

He thought the first rule would render Great

Britain liable for the escape of the vessels*

The duty of neutrals

he thought should be confined to the obligation of preventing an
armed vessel from leaving a port to make war on a friendly nation,
it looked to him he saia like paying a tribute to buy peace*

He

remarked further, "There is no saying to what extent these rules
6
will make us liable."
He pointed out that a vessel might leave a
port with 'the secret intention of making war against a friendly
power, and that the rules would hold the government liable even
though they had use^ due diligence as far as they possibly could.
His objections were increased by the fact that the British commis
sioners had ignoreu the claims which Canada made against the United
States.

He thought the British commissioners had yieideu to the dej

manas of the American commissioners too easily.

He said:

"Everything has been concession on our sine, and assertion....
without argument on the part of the United States. Our com
missioners did not trouble the imerioan commissioners to go
into any argument; they merely....accepted the assertion that
they could not entertain the question of compensating the
Canadians for the Fenian outrages....So to with regard to
the Fisheries."
In defense of the treaty lord Granville saia that no admis
sion of liability because of negligence haa oeen m&ue.

in regard

to the claims which Canada mace, he said that they were taxen care
of to the satisfaction of the Canadian representative on the com
mission, and that claims for the Fenian raids had not been insisted
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upon because it was known that they would not be allowed by the
American commissioners*

It was thought better to yield that point

than to destroy the fruits of the entire negotiations, but he
added that the Fenian claims had been by no means abandoned,

lord

Granville said he thought the treaty was decidedly in favor of
Great Britain since so many of the claims against Great Britain had
already been settled.

The great concession on the part of the

United States was the withdrawal of the indirect claims,

lord

Granville said: "They entirely disappear under the limited reference
....which includes merely complaints arising out of the escape of
the Alabama."^

It was the desire of the commission he said to pro

vide rules for the future.

In his opinion a great advantage would

aacrue to Great Britain by having the Unitea States agree to abide
by the three rules.

He said they were no more stringent than their

own Foreign Enlistment Act since it was amended.

He concluded:

"I defy any one to say there is any country which has a
greater interest than we have in escaping such depredations
as were committed by the Alabama. We have agreeu to prin
ciples which we think are just and right.... and we have
agreeu that our subsequent legislation shall be judged by
them.
Earl de Grey also considered that the government had accom
plished a signal benefit in binding the American government by rules
which were just and reasonable in tnemselves, and from which England
herself would derive much benefit in the event of future wars,

10

lord Cairns saw great merit in the expression of sorrow for the
acts committed.

He said the treaty was binding upon the country

even though ratifications had not yet b en exchanged.

The three

rules he felt were important guides for future conduct.11

The Earl

of Kimberly saw great advantages for Canada in the agreement maae in
1
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regard to the fisheries.

12

Earl Derby thought that the treaty was

a poor one, but that it should be accepted as an accomplished fact.
He said that the expression of regret might prejudice the British
13
case before the arbitrators.
On the other hand, Earl Carnarvon thought that the treaty was
a bad bargain.

He thought the claims for the Fenian raids should

have been included in tne arbitration to balance the Alabama
claims.14

She Marquess of Salisbury thought the treaty gave Great

Britain nothing but "the advantage of calming the susceptibilities
of the American people.

The Duke of Argyll, however, said that

the advantages gained by the acknowledgement of the three great
rules of international law for the future would off-set any conces
sions th ..t were made.16

After the debate Lora Bussell's motion was

defeated by an almost unanimous vote. 17
On August 4 the merits of the treaty were debated in the
House of Commons when Sir Sharles Adderley moved to lay the corres
pondence before the House.

He repeated the same objections to the

treaty which had been made in the House of Lords previously, but be
closed his speech by expressing a hope that the general result would
16
be favorable to good will, peace, ana international cordiality*
•Sir.r!oundell Palmer, who was a member of the cabinet,
when Adams was building up his case,
defended the treaty by saying th. t tne most satisfactory part of it
was that which set down rules for the future and allowed them to be
applied as rules to judge the past.

ne said that it was not admitted

that the government had actually failed to perform its public dutj/.
Whatever might be the imperfections of the treaty, he felt that if
it resulted in permanent peace and good will, he would be willing
to pay any amount which could be assessed against England as a
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result of the treaty.
Sir Stafford Korthcote defended the work of the commission
ers.

He denied Lord Russell's contention that the British commis

sioners had agreed to whatever was proposed by the American commis
sioners and declareu that national honor justified the treaty* The
treaty he said excluded the question of the recognition of belli
gerency and the indirect claims, and the rules which were set down
would he for the benefit of peace of the whole world.

He said that

in any case where England was concerned, it ?;as important to con
sider whether America would be friendly or hostile.

He closed by

saying:
"There never was a time when it was more desirable for the
maintenance of the foremost position of England in the coun
cils of Europe. ... .with respect to the maintenance of peace
.... There never was a time when they (the government) had a
greater opportunity, ana at which a greater responsibility
rested upon them than at that moment, and he firmly believed
thut the Treaty of Washington, although it might be open to
captious observations, and might possioly contain some real
defects, was.... a great step in the promotion and toward the
attainment of that desirable end."^u
Hathbone said he knew what the feelings of the British mer
chants -were on this matter: "That feeling was one of gratitude
to the Government and the Commissioners for what they had done in
'

O *1

effecting the Treaty."

He went on to say that the opinion in

Liverpool was that it would be utterly impossible to maintain com
merce if Alabama could be fitted out in neutral ports.

He added

that the commissioners haa laid aside mere technicalities and had
looked to great principles of justice and national morality.
Gladstone pointed out that the duties of neutrals were be
coming more and more difficult, and that England's position was
especially peculiar in that respect because of the large amourt of

her foreign commerce.

With Gladstone the desire to end the quarrel

with the United States was not a consequence of the possible troubles
with foreign nations.

His view was wider and less specific.

He

realized also that the power of Great Britain in Europe was lessened
by the bad feeling existing with the Uxiitea States, but he took a
higher ground than this in his appreciation of the benefit to the
world arising from an absolute reconciliation in good faith between
the two English speaking nations.

He said the great concession

was to have consentea to go to arbitration as to whether there was
any defect in the administration of their own municipal law, and he
hoped that the three rules would widen into an international law
for the benefit of the whole world.
After the debate, the motion of Sir Charles Adaerley was
withdrawn.
The work of the tribunal seemed to be following a smooth
course until it was learned that the formal American statement of
the case put before the arbitrators included not only losses suf
fered by individual citizens, but also the indirect and national
claims were included in the final chapter of the American case,
which had not been sent in for criticism by Fish and Hoar as had
the other chapters.

The American counsel maintained that by the

language of the treaty, those claims were legitimately included,
while the British government took the opposite view and stood firm
ly upon their position.
There was a general feeling of alarm and surprise in England
to find that the indirect claims were again brought forward*

The

press and menbers of Parliament immediately demanded that either
these claims be repudiated or England would withdraw from the

lOfi

convention.

The Queen's speech on February 3, 1872 announced that

the indirect claims were not within the province of the arbitrators.
Gladstone was in favor of breaking off the arbitration rather than
to agree to submit the indirect claims to arbitration.

Disraeli

spoke of the indirect claims as preposterous and wild,

Gladstone

thought that this was rather an understatement than an exaggeration
and went on to say, "We must be insane to accede to demands which
no nation with a spark of honour or spirit left could submit even
at the point of death."'"

lord De la Warr declared in the debate

that the indirect claims were utterly inadmissable and could not
for a moment be entertained,

lord Granville referred to a previous

statement in which he said, "They (the indirect claims) entirely
disappear under the limited reference... which includes merely
complaints arising out of the escape of the Alabama,"^

low he

said he trusted he should be able to show by reference to the word
ing of the treaty, to the statements of the commissioners, ano. to
the correspondence, that both governments felt that these claims
were excluded by the words of the treaty.^6
On the same day in the House of Commons, Disraeli said that
he had always been in favor of maintaining friendly relations with
the Unite- States.

He thought that the indirect claims demanded a

tribute greater than could be exacted by conquest.

He said, "V.e

cannot, in justice to ourselves.... consent to propositions too
enormous for practical purposes....which, if persisted in, can only
lead "do an alienation of feelings.
Those who had opposed the treaty accused the government of
acceding to an instrument in which the indirect claims could be
legitimately produced and sustained*

Gladstone declared that the
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interpretation put upon the treaty by the British government was
the true ariG unambiguous meaning of the words, and not one of sever
al conflicting meanings which coulu be attached to the treaty.

He

said that the indirect claims were excluded by any test of the
treaty, whether it be by grammar, by reason, by poJicy, or by any
other standard*

He expressed his hope that friendly relations

coula be restored, ana he hoped to make it as easy as possible for
the Unitea States to meet their demand.

He was clearly disappointed

that the United States had again advanced the indirect claims alter
Greet Britain haa made such extensive concession.

He said, ",Ye

are determined to stretch to the utmost all considerations which
are capable of such a process; that everything except national honor
and national safety would be risked for the object we prise so
dearly— namely the re-establishment of cordial relations with the
United States.
The differences as to whether the indirect claims were incluaed was the result of a misunderstanding.

all members of the British

cabinet accepted the vie. that if a direct repudiation of those
.

claims had been insisted Upon by the British Commissioners, no
treaty would have been tossible.

Both sides in the Washington con

ference hiid been more anxious to submit the claims to the arbitra
tors rather than to settle the principle involved themselves • The
American commissioners knew their position to be unsound, but they
also knew that their own people expected the claims to be referred,
it would have been unpolitic to waive them entirely.

The British

commissioners were willing to waive an express renunciation of them,
being confident that the terms of the protocols and the language of
the treaty would be so construed by the arbitrators to exclude the
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indirect claims.

2 he cabinet agreed that a virtual waiver of the

claims was to be found both in the protocols ana in the treaty.
Lord Ripon and Forster thought it would be safe to go on at Geneva
in the assurance that the arbitrators v.oula be certain to rule the
OO
indirect claims out.
The difficulty of the government of the United States in deal
ing with the Alabama claims was not uue to any faith in their
soundness but to the difficulty in getting rid of them.

Fish haa

written to Schenck on April S3, 1672 that the United States would
at any time have waived the indirect claims for any equivalent, or
in connection with any settlement, had they been askea so to do
during the negotiation of the treaty.

Fish also told Adams that

he was willing to have the indirect claims decided adversely, but
tnat he thought they ought >>0 be disposed in one way or another.
Through the gooa offices of adams the tribunal made an extrajudicial
statement which excluded the indirect claims from further consiaer29
ation.
In May 1673 after the tribunal had mate the award, the
treaty came up for discussion during a debate on the supply report.
Betinck criticized the government violently.

He said that the

government hac followed an unconstitutional course by not submit
ting the treaty to Parliament for ratification after it haa been
accepted by the cabinet.

Gregory, who haa been a partisan of the

South during the Civil War, said the House of Commons should enter
a protest against the principles on which the treaty was based*
All the previous arguments were advanced, but no new or significant
point was raised.

Clearly it was a move against the ministry since

the payment of the award on the part of Great Britain was a fore
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gone conclusion.

Gladstone defended his government and the treaty.

He said that the three rules were already a part of international
law at the time the claims arose, and maintained that the municipal
law covered the same points.

He declared that those rules had

played no part in the decision of the tribunal.

Of the treaty in

general he had this to say:
"Any amount of disappointment we may feel at the result is
but a considerable deduction for the satisfaction attendant
upon such an arrangement which removes such causes of differ
ence between two great countries lixe England and America,
and does so much,....for mankind at large by the example it
sets for a peaceful settlement of disputes as a substitute
for the bloody arbitrament of war.
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Appendix

Appendix A
Queen’s Proclamation of Neutrality
" ..whereas hostilities have unhappily commenced between the
Government of the United States of America and certain States styl
ing themselves the Confederate States of America;
"And whereas we, being at peace with the Government of the
United States, have declared our royal determination to maintain a
strict and impartial neutrality in the contest between the said
contending parties;
" We therefore have thought fit.... to issue this....proclama
tion.
"...... it is, among other things, declared... as follows:
"That if any natural-born subject of His Majesty.... shall
take or accept.... any military commission or shall otherwise enter
into military service..... in any warlike or military operation in
the service of..... any foreign prince, state, potentate,........
or of any person or persons exercising or assuming to exercise the
powers of government in ...any foreign country.... ; or if any nat
ural-born subject.... shall..... agree to enlist or enter himself
to serve as sailor or marine, or to be employed...... on board any
ship..... intended to be used for any warlike purpose..... ; or if
any natural-born subject.... shall.... go.... to any foreign state
.... with the intent to serve in any warlike or military operation;
or if any person whatever, within the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland shall hire, retain, engage, or procure, or
shall attempt to hire, retain, engage, or procure, any person...
to enlist or to enter..... in any such service or employments as
aforesaid....... ; in any or either of such cases, every person
so offending shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon
being convicted thereof, upon any information or indictment, shall
be punished by fine and imprisonment, or either of them, at the
discretion of the court before which such offender shall be con
victed.
"And it is .... further enacted:
"That if any person..... shall..... equip, furnish, fit
out, or arm,..... or be concerned in the equipping, furnishing,
fitting out, or arming, of any ship or vessel, with intent... that
such ship or vessel shall be employed in the service of any ....
foreign state.... or of any persons exercising or assuming to
exercise any powers of government in....any foreign state....as a
transport of store-ship, or with Intent to cruise or commit hos
tilities against any...state, or against the persons exercising
or assuming to exercise the powers of government in any .... part
of any.... country, with whom His Majesty shall not then be at war,
or shall, upon conviction thereof upon any information or indict
ment, be punishable by fine and imprisonment, or either of them,
..... ; and every such ship or vesset.....together with all the
materials, arms, ammunition, and stores...... shall be forfeited;
and it shall be lawful for any officer of His Majesty's customs
or excise, or any officer of His Majesty's navy to seize such
shins and vessels— ..under the laws of customs and excise, or
under the laws of tra.de and navigation; and that every such ship
and vessel.... may be orosecuted and condemned... in such courts

113

for any breach of the laws made for the protection of the reven
ues of customs and excise, or of the laws of trade and naviga
tion.
"And it is....... further enacted:
"Chat if any person..... s h a l l .... increase or augment..]
the warlike force of any ship or vessel of war, ...... every such
person so offendin; shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and
shall, upon being convicted thereof.... be punishable by fine
and imprisonment, or either of them........
"ITow in order that none of our subjects may unwarily
render themselves liable to the penalties imposed by the said
statute, we do hereby strictly command, that no person..... do
commit any act.... contrary to the provisions of the said statute,
upon pain of the several penalties...., and of our high displeasure.
"And we do hereby further warn .... our....subjects.....
that if any of them shall presume..... to do any acts in deroga
tion of their duty as subjects of a neutral sovereign in the said
contest..... all persons so offending will incur and be liable to
the several penalties and penal consequences by the said statute
or by the law of nations........
"And we do hereby declare, that all our subjects.....
who may misconduct themselves....will do so at their peril....
and they will in nowise obtain any protection from us against
any liabilities or displeasure by such misconduct."

'^'Papers Relating to the Treaty of Washington, 42 Cong., 3rd Sess.,
Washington, 1873, Vol. I., o. 215-218.
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APPENDIX B
Our Claims On England
Speech of Charles Sumner in Executive Session of the
Senate, April 13, 1869, on the Johnson-Clarendon Treaty
for the settlement of Claims,
”.... In the interest of peace, which everyone should have
at heart, the treaty must he rejected. A treaty which, instead
of removing an existing grievance, leaves it for heartburning
and rancor, cannot be considered a settlement of pending ques
tions between two nations. It may seem to settle them, 'but does
not. It is nothing but a snare. And such is the character of
the treaty now before us. The massive grievance under which our
country suffered for years is left untouched; the painful sense
of wrong planted in the national heart is allowed to remain. For
all this there is not one word of regret or even of recognition;
nor is there any semblance of compensation.............
The Case Against England
"Close upon the outbreak of our troubles, just one month
after the bombardment of Fort Sumter, when the rebellion was still
undeveloped when the National Government was beginning those
gigantic efforts which ended so triumphantly, the country was
startled by the news that the British Government had intervened
by a proclamation, which accorded belligerent rights to the re
bels. At the early date when this was done the rebels were, as
they remained to the close, without ships on the ocean, without
Prize Courts or other tribunals for the administration of justice
on the ocean, without any of those conditions which are the es
sential prerequisites to such a concession.... In the swiftness
of this bestowal there was very little consideration for a
friendly Power; nor does it appear that there was any inquiry
into those conditions precedent on which it must depend. Ocean
belligerency being a 'fact' and not a 'principle1 can be recog
nized only on evidence showing its actual existence.......
"Unfriendly in the precipitancy with which it was launched,
this concession was more unfriendly in substance.
It was the
first stage in the depredations on our commerce. Had it not been
made no rebel ship could have been built in England. Every step
in her building would have been piracy. Nor could any munitions
of war have been furnished. The direct consequence of this
concession was to place the rebels on an equality with ourselves
in all British markets, whether of ships or munitions of war.....
"Then came the building of the pirate ships, one after
another.... Here beyond all question was negligence, or accord
ing to the language of -^ord Broughan on another occasion,1crass
negligence', making England justly responsible for all that en
sued..... There was negligence in allowing the building to pro-
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oeed, negligence in allowing the escape from Liverpool, and
negligence in allowing the final escape from the British coast....
"The enlistment of the crew was not less obnoxious to cen
sure than the building of the ship and her escape.... The dedica
tion of the ship to the rebel service.....made her departure as
much a hostile expedition, as if she had sailed forth from her
Majesty s dock-yard. At a moment of profound peace, between the
United States and England, there was a hostile"expedition against
the United States. It was in no sense a commercial transaction,
but an act of war.......
"...... Thus at three different stages, the British Gov
ernment is compromised, first in the concession of ocean bellig
erency, on which all depended; secondly in the negligence v/hich
allowed the evasion of the ships in order to enter upon the hos
tile expedition for which she was built, manned, armed, and
rquipped; and, thirdly, in the open complicity, which, after this
evasion, gave her welcome hospitality and supplies in British
ports..... To England must be traced also all the widespread con
sequences which ensued........ "
Reparations from England
"At last the rebellion succumbed. British ships and British
supplies had done their work, but they failed. And now the day
of reckoning has come; but with little apparent sense of what is
due on the part of England. Without one soothing word for a
friendly £ower deeply aggrieved, without a single word of regret
England simply proposes to submit the question of liability for
'individual*losses' to an anamalous tribunal, where chance plays
its part..... Nothing is admitted even on this question; no rule
for the future is established; while nothing is said of the in
dignity to the nation, nor of the damages to the nation.......
The Extent of Our losses
"Individual losses may be estimated with reasonable accuracy.
Ships burned or sunk with their cargoes may be counted and their
value determined; but this leaves without recognition the vaster
damage to commerce driven from the ocean, and that other damage,
immense and infinite, caused by the prolongation of the war,
all of which may be called national in contradistinction to
individual.
a 3 ,
.
,
"Our national losses have been frankly conceded by eminent
Englishmen. (Sumner quoting Mr. Gobden) 'You have been', said^
he^ 'carrying on war from these shores with the United States,
and have been inflicting an amount of damage on that country
greater than would be produced by many ordinary wars. It is
esstimated that the loss sustained by the capture and burning of
American vessels has been about $15,000,000,........But this
is a small uart of the injury which has been inflicted on the
American marine. We have rendered the rest of her vast mercan
tile property useless.'............

lie

"...... The loss may be seen in various circximstances, as in
the rise of insurance on all American vessels; the fate of the
carrying trade, which was one of the great resources of our
country; the diminution of our tonnage with the corresponding
increase of British tonnage; the falling off in our exports and
imports, with due allowance for our abnormal currency and the
diversion of war...............
"Beyond the actual loss in the national tonnage, there was
a further loss in the arrest of our natural increase in this
branch of industry, which an intelligent statistician puts at
five per cent, annually,.......
"These (losses) are large enough; but there is another
chapter, where they are larger far. i refer, of course, to the
national losses caused by the prolongation of the war and trace
able directly to England....... Hot weeks or months, but years
were a d d e d .... to our war...........
"The sacrifice of precious life is beyond human compensation;
but there may be an approximate estimate of the national loss in
money. The Rebellion was suppressed at a cost of more than four
thousand million dollars, a considerable portion of which has been
already paid, leaving twenty-five hundred millions as a national
debt to burden the people. If, through British intervention,
the war was doubled in duration, or in any way extended, as can
not be doubted, then is England Justly responsible for the ad
ditional expenditure to which our country was doomed; and, what
ever may be the final settlement of these great accounts, such
must be the judgment in any chancery which consults the simple
equity of the case.
Conclusion
"If the case against England is strong, and if our claims
against England are unprecedented in magnitude, it is only be
cause the conduct of this Power at a trying period was most un
friendly, and the injurious consequences of this conduct were
on a scale corresponding to the theater of action. Life and
property were both swallowed up, leaving behind a deep-seated
sense of enormous wrong, as yet unatoned and even unacknowledged,
which is one of the chief factors in the problem now presented
to the statesmen of both countries.... .
"There are many among us who, taking counsel of a sense of
national wrong, would leave them to rest without settlement, so
as to furnish a precedent for retaliation in kind, should Eng
land find herself at war.... It is not difficult to imagine one
of our countrymen saying with Shakespear's Jew, 'The villainy
you teach me I will execute, and it shall go hard, but I will
better the instruction;' nor is it difficult to imagine an Eng
lishman firm in his conceit, that no apology can oe made and
nothing paid......... "
■^Cong. Globe, 41 Gong. , 1st Sess., Washington, 1869, Appendix,
p. 20-26.

APPENDIX C
Sumner's Arraignment of the President in His
Speech on San Domingo
"In Great Britain the exclusive prerogative of making
treaties is in the Crown, and so in most other countries it is
in the executive; but I need not remind you that in our country
it is otherwise. The exclusive prerogative here is not in the
Executive; it is in the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate and until that advice and consent have
been given he can exercise no power under that treaty. Those
waters were as sacred as the waters about France and England.
He might as well have penetrated the ports of either of~those
countries and launched his menace there as have penetrated the
waters of this weak Power and launched his menace.
"I have called it an act of war— war, sir, made by the
Executive without the consent of Congress.........
"If Congress had declared war against this feeble republic,
then it would have been the part of the Executive to carry that
declaration into effect; but until then what right had our Exe
cutive to do this thing? None which can be vindicated by the
laws of our country, none except what is found in the law of
force.
"This outrage by our Navy upon a sister republic is aggrava
ted by the issue which the President of the United States in his
annual message has directly made with the President of Hayti—
mark my words--with the president of Hayti......... And now,
sir, listen to what the president of Hayti in this annual
message says of the project of annexation, and then in one
moment listen to the issue which the President of the United
States has joined with this president...... "The project of
annexation of the Dominican part has been rejected by the Ameri
can Senate. The anxieties which this annexation caused to
spring up have been dissipated before the good sense and the
wisdom of the Senate at Washington. '
"Of course the President of the United States was intimate
with this documsnt. He could not have undertaken to launch
his bolt against this feeble republic without knowing at least
what their^president had said. I will not do him wrong to
supDOse him ignorant, His Secretary of State must have inform
ed him. He must have known the precise words that President
Saget had employed when he said that the anxieties caused by
this annexation were dissipated before the good sense and wis
dom of the Senate at Washington. Our President joins issue with
President Saget; he says that the rejection of the treaty was
a ’follyl There you have it. The president of one republic
calls the rejection an act of ’good sense and wisdom ; t..e
President of the United States calls it an act of 'folly.’ Am
I wrong? Let me read from the message of our President:
large commercial city will spring up, to which we will be tributarP without receiving corresponding benefits, and then will be

seen the folly of our rejecting so great a prize.1
"There you have it. President Saget and President Grant;
President Grant speaking with the voice of forty million, and’
this other president who has only eight hundred thousand peoole,
all black.
"If the President of the United States had contented him
self with thus Joining issue with the president of Hayti I
should have left the two face to face; but not content with
making this issue, the President of the United States proceeds
to menace the independence of Hayti. Sir, the case is serious...
"History is often said to repeat itself. More or less it
does..... This whole measure of annexation, and the spirit with
which it is pressed find a parallel in the Kansas and Nebraska
bill, and in the lecompton constitution, by which it was sought
to subjugate a distant territory to slavery.... and now we
witness the same things— violence in a distant island, as there
was in Kansas; also the same presidential appliances; and, shall
I add, the same menace of personal assault?
"In other days, to carry a project, a President has tried
to change a committee. It was James Buchanan. And now we have
been called this session to witness a similar endeavor by our
President. He was not satisfied with the Committee on Foreign
Relations as constituted for years. He wished a change. He
asked first for the removal of the chairman. Somebody told him
that this would not be convenient. He then asked for the removal
of the Senator from Missouri, and he was told that this could
not be done without affecting the German vote. He then called
for the removal of my friend the Senator from New Hampshire,
who unhappily was not a German. It was finally settled that
this could not be done.
"I allude to these things reluctantly and only as part of
the case. They illustrate the spirit we are called to encounter.
They illustrate the extent to which the President has fallen
into the line of bad examples."1
1 . dong.’ Globe, 41 Cong., 1st Sess., Washington, 1871, pt. 1,
p. 226-231.
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